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Sonja B.  Starr & M. Marit Rehavi 
 
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: 
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of 
Booker 
abstract.  This Article presents new empirical evidence concerning the effects of United 
States v. Booker, which loosened the formerly mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, on racial 
disparities in federal criminal cases. Two serious limitations pervade existing empirical literature 
on sentencing disparities. First, studies focus on sentencing in isolation, controlling for the 
“presumptive sentence” or similar measures that themselves result from discretionary charging, 
plea-bargaining, and fact-finding processes. Any disparities in these earlier processes are 
excluded from the resulting sentence-disparity estimates. Our research has shown that this 
exclusion matters: pre-sentencing decision-making can have substantial sentence-disparity 
consequences. Second, existing studies have used loose causal inference methods that fail to 
disentangle the effects of sentencing-law changes, such as Booker, from surrounding events and 
trends.  
 In contrast, we use a dataset that traces cases from arrest to sentencing, allowing us to 
assess Booker’s effects on disparities in charging, plea-bargaining, and fact-finding, as well as 
sentencing. We disentangle background trends by using a rigorous regression discontinuity-style 
design. Contrary to other studies (and in particular, the dramatic recent claims of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission), we find no evidence that racial disparity has increased since Booker, 
much less because of Booker. Unexplained racial disparity remains persistent, but does not 
appear to have increased following the expansion of judicial discretion. 
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In the United States, one of every nine black men between the ages of 
twenty and thirty-four is behind bars,1 and, in 2003, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics projected that one in every three young black men could expect to be 
incarcerated at some point in his life.2 These rates far exceed those of any other 
demographic group—for instance, black males are incarcerated at nearly seven 
times the rate of white males.3 The impact of demographically concentrated 
incarceration rates on offenders, families, and communities is a critical social 
concern.4 But why do these gaps exist? Can they be explained by differences in 
criminal behavior, or by differences in how the criminal justice system treats 
offenders? If it is the latter, can the process be improved by reforms, such as 
changes to sentencing law? 
These questions are not new. For decades, racial and other “legally 
unwarranted” disparities in sentencing have been the subject of considerable 
empirical research, which has in turn helped to shape major policy changes. 
Most importantly, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and their state counterparts 
were adopted with the goal of reducing such disparities. In 2005, when the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker rendered the formerly 
mandatory Guidelines merely advisory, Justice Stevens’s dissent predicted that 
“[t]he result is certain to be a return to the same type of sentencing disparities 
Congress sought to eliminate in 1984.”5 Whether this prediction was accurate 
is perhaps the foremost empirical question in sentencing policy today. The 
most prominent study to date, a 2010 report of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, gave an alarming answer: Booker and its judicial progeny had 
quadrupled the black-white sentencing gap among otherwise-similar cases, 
 
1.  Pew Ctr. on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 3 
(Feb. 2008), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100 
.pdf. 
2.  Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 (Aug. 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/piusp01.pdf. 
3.  Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 7, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (last updated Feb. 9, 
2012). 
4.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); IMPRISONING 
AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Patillo et al. eds., 2004). 
5.  543 U.S. 220, 300 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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from 5.5% to 23.3%.6 In January 2013, the Commission issued an update with 
similar figures (revising the latter figure slightly downward, to 19.5%), this 
time combined with explicit calls for legislation in effect returning the 
Guidelines to something fairly close to their prior binding status.7 
This Article introduces a new empirical approach and gives a very different 
answer. The Commission’s methods are hobbled by two serious limitations 
that also pervade the broader empirical literature on sentencing disparity.8 
First, these studies consider the judge’s final sentencing decision in isolation, 
ignoring crucial earlier stages of the justice process. Those earlier stages have 
important sentencing consequences, and yet these studies exclude the portions 
of the ultimate sentence gap that result from earlier-stage decision-making 
from their estimates. Second, studies of changes in disparity after legal changes 
(like Booker) have failed to disentangle the effects of the legal change from 
surrounding events and background trends. 
This Article develops these two critiques and discusses our own research on 
racial disparities among federal arrestees, which uses a method that avoids 
these problems. We first highlight some findings from our recent study 
showing that while a black-white gap appears to be introduced during the 
criminal justice process, it appears to stem largely from prosecutors’ charging 
choices, especially decisions to charge defendants with “mandatory minimum” 
offenses. These findings highlight the importance of taking into account the 
early parts of the justice process. With that in mind, we then present our new 
findings on Booker, estimating its effects not only on sentencing, but also on 
charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding, an analysis no prior 
studies have performed. Far from finding evidence that judges’ use of 
expanded discretion worsens disparity, we fail to find an increase in disparity 
and find suggestive evidence cutting in the opposite direction.9 
 
6.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
3 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/scj/documents/USSC_Multivariate_Regression_Analysis 
_ Report_001.pdf [hereinafter 2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N]. 
7.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. A, at 8-9, 108 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov 
/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Booker_Reports 
/2012_Booker/index.cfm [hereinafter 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N]. The update extended 
the last period through 2011. 
8.  While we focus on race, these weaknesses are also common in research on other 
“unwarranted disparities” (for example, inter-district) and much of the non-disparity-
related research on sentencing policy. 
9.  The Booker results are exclusively and fully presented in this Article. We begin, however, by 
discussing the results of a separate but related study of racial disparities in charging and 
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Our research seeks to close a surprisingly wide gap that separates two 
bodies of scholarship: the theoretical and qualitative literature on how the 
criminal justice system functions (which uniformly recognizes the critical role 
of prosecutors) and empirical research on sentencing disparities (which 
effectively ignores that role). The modern criminal justice process is 
prosecutor-dominated. Prosecutors have broad charging and plea-bargaining 
discretion, and their choices have a huge impact on sentences. A central claim 
made by critics of mandatory sentencing is that restricting judicial discretion 
further empowers prosecutors, who tend to exercise that power in ways that 
perpetuate or worsen disparity. This “hydraulic discretion” theory has been 
described as a near-consensus view of sentencing scholars.10 
Yet the empirical research on sentencing disparity has not tested these 
claims and fails to account for the role of prosecutorial discretion. Researchers 
typically estimate sentencing disparities in federal and other courts subject to 
sentencing guidelines after controlling for (among other things) the 
recommended guidelines sentence. But the guidelines recommendation is itself 
the end product of charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding. 
Controlling for it filters disparities in those processes out of the sentencing-
disparity estimates and gives an incomplete view of the scope and sources of 
sentencing disparity.11 In effect, the existing literature focuses on disparities in 
 
sentencing more generally. In this Article, we discuss that study’s motivations, highlight key 
results, and explain its relevance to current law and policy debates, including the Sentencing 
Commission’s report. The full results, including relevant tables and graphs and a full 
technical explanation of our methods, can be found in M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, 
Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. of Mich. 
Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002, 2012) (under review), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377. 
10.  Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An 
Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 
155-56 (1987) (noting that “this ‘hydraulic’ or ‘zero-sum’ effect is so firmly entrenched as a 
criticism of current reform efforts that most researchers begin with the assumption that the 
displacement of discretion exists”); Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal 
Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District 
Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 395-96 (2010) (observing that “scholars agree that attempts to 
curtail judicial discretion are likely to concomitantly increase prosecutorial discretion” and 
that “prosecutorial discretion . . . may risk the perpetuation of the types of disparities 
sentencing reforms were intended to reduce”). 
11.  A few studies (most notably the Sentencing Commission’s Booker study) compound this 
problem further by also controlling for differences in Guidelines departure rates, filtering 
out one of the key aspects of the final sentencing decision as well. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. E, at 7 (including “whether the court determined 
that a sentence outside the applicable sentencing guideline range was warranted” among a 
list of control variables); 2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, at 18, app. B at B-1 
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compliance with the sentencing guidelines. While this is an important piece of 
the sentence-disparity picture, it is far from the only piece, because decisions 
made throughout the process ultimately affect the sentence. Moreover, 
sentencing-stage disparities might either offset or exacerbate disparities arising 
earlier, making it hard to interpret them in isolation. 
We accordingly take a broader, process-wide approach, constructing a 
dataset that links records from four different federal agencies and allows us to 
trace criminal cases from arrest through sentencing. We focus on the gap 
between black men and white men in non-immigration cases. Instead of 
controlling for the Guidelines sentence, we control for the arrest offense and 
other characteristics that are fixed at the beginning of the justice process. The 
arrest offense is an imperfect proxy for underlying criminal behavior, but we 
believe it is the best proxy available for this purpose. Our method allows us to 
assess aggregate disparities introduced throughout the post-arrest justice 
process, from charging through sentencing. Further, it also allows us to analyze 
the contribution of each procedural stage (as well as underlying case 
differences) to the total black-white gap. 
The problem with the prevailing method is not merely an academic 
concern. In Part II of this Article, we highlight and discuss key findings of our 
analyses of charging and sentencing in federal criminal cases from 2007 to 
2009.12 That research shows that after controlling for the arrest offense, 
criminal history, and other prior characteristics, there remains a black-white 
sentence-length gap of about 10%. But judges’ choices do not appear to be 
principally responsible. Instead, between half and the entire gap can be 
explained by the prosecutor’s initial charging decision—specifically, the 
decision to bring a charge carrying a “mandatory minimum.” After controlling 
for pre-charge case characteristics, prosecutors in our sample were nearly twice 
as likely to bring such a charge against black defendants.13 In other words, 
studies that focus only on the judicial sentencing decision exclude what appears 
to be the most important procedural source of disparity in sentences. 
A proper analysis of Booker’s effects on disparity, then, should take the 
whole justice process into account, to the extent possible. In Part III, we present 
 
(providing a similar list and explaining that the Commission used separate dummy variables 
for substantial assistance departures, other downward departures, and upward departures). 
12.  See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9. 
13.  These results are for non-drug cases. When drug cases are added, the gap after controlling 
for prior characteristics rises to about 14%, and mandatory minimums similarly appear to 
explain nearly all of the disparity. The charging study’s analysis of drug cases is somewhat 
more limited. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77. In contrast, this Article’s study of 
Booker includes drug cases in all its analyses. 
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the results of such an analysis. We begin that inquiry with a simple linear time-
trend analysis, which shows that, when one measures sentence disparity in the 
broader way that we recommend, unexplained black-white disparity did not 
grow between 2003 and 2009, the period in which the Sentencing Commission 
found that it quadrupled. Indeed, our estimate of the disparity trend is negative, 
although imprecise. That is, the gap in sentences for similar black and white 
arrestees was, if anything, slightly smaller by the end of 2009 than it was just 
before Booker. The Commission’s claim that disparity grew over that same 
period is an artifact of its flawed way of measuring disparity. 
Beyond the question of whether disparity has changed during the period 
surrounding Booker, we must further ask whether it has changed because of 
Booker. The two questions are not the same, but they are too often confused. In 
addition to the disparity-measurement question, a second serious flaw 
pervades the empirical literature on sentencing-law changes: the failure to 
provide a sound basis for causal inferences. This second problem is exemplified 
by the Sentencing Commission’s analysis. The Commission found that 
disparities after Booker (averaged over a period of years) were larger than 
disparities before it. Even assuming that were true, it would still be a huge 
logical leap to conclude that Booker caused this increase—a classic confusion of 
correlation and causation. Many things change over time—for instance, the 
mix of cases, the composition of the bench and of U.S. Attorneys’ and public 
defenders’ offices, substantive criminal legislation and case law, and the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) enforcement priorities and internal policies—
and any of these changes could have racially disparate impacts on sentences. 
The greater disparity in the post-Booker period, therefore, could easily have 
nothing to do with Booker. Indeed, even if Booker had slowed an underlying 
trend of increasing disparity, the Commission’s methods would incorrectly 
imply that Booker led to greater disparity. 
Accordingly, we employ a different approach that can disentangle the effect 
of Booker from underlying trends: a regression discontinuity-style estimator. 
Specifically, we assess whether, in the immediate aftermath of Booker, there is a 
sharp break in an otherwise continuous trend, which would provide a much 
stronger basis for inferring causality. Our method focuses on Booker’s 
immediate effects, not its long-term effects, which admittedly is both a 
strength and a weakness. The long-term effects are presumably what 
policymakers care most about, but there is no good way to identify Booker’s 
relationship to longer-term trends in disparity—the causal inference problem is 
too serious. The immediate effects can be more rigorously assessed. 
Fortunately, there is good reason to believe that if Booker had substantially 
changed racial disparity patterns in judicial decision-making, we would have 
seen at least part of the effect right away. Booker’s effects on Guidelines 
compliance were not slow or subtle—departure rates immediately and 
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dramatically spiked. That is, Booker was a sudden shock to the scope of judicial 
discretion, and, if judges were inclined to exercise their discretion in ways that 
widen the black-white gap, one would expect to see disparity jump in response 
to that shock, right after Booker. 
We do not see such a jump. Right after Booker, sentencing disparity did not 
increase, and may have modestly dropped. If Booker did have any adverse 
effects on black defendants relative to white defendants, it was probably a 
second-order result of charging changes: the use of mandatory minimum 
charges increased for black defendants immediately after Booker, but this effect 
appears to have been quite short-term. 
We are very cautious about these findings. Even with our approach, 
identifying Booker’s effects is hard. While Booker has been described as a 
“natural experiment,”14 as an experiment it leaves much to be desired—it 
changed the legal regime for every non-petty federal offense at once, leaving no 
plausible control group. Our method does not require a control group and 
filters out longer-term trends effectively, but it could be tricked by month-to-
month fluctuations. Moreover, Booker was not a clean break in settled law; it 
came on the heels of a period of serious lower-court confusion, further 
complicating causal inference. We conduct tests to evaluate these problems, 
but we cannot erase the noise in the data or the complexity of the history. Still, 
what we can say is that nothing in these data suggests that judges’ use of their 
post-Booker discretion exacerbated racial disparity. 
Understanding the relative role of prosecutors and judges in producing 
disparities is important. The specter of increased disparity after Booker has been 
prominently cited to support new constraints on judicial discretion. For 
instance, the Department of Justice in the George W. Bush Administration 
advocated mandatory topless guidelines—effectively, mandatory minimums 
but no maximums.15 The Sentencing Commission has recently advanced a 
multi-pronged proposal to strengthen legislative and appellate court 
constraints on judicial sentencing discretion—a proposal that in effect would 
restore the Guidelines very nearly to the legal status they enjoyed before 
Booker.16 
 
14.  Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using Empirical Research to 
Inform the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 433, 435 (2007). 
15.  See Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzalez: Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/archive 
/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm. 
16.  The proposal includes requiring judges to give substantial weight to the Guidelines, 
restricting policy-based departures, and requiring appellate courts to give deference to 
Guidelines sentences. 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 111-15; Judge 
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Such “solutions” could be counterproductive. Constraints on judges 
generally empower prosecutors by making their choices more conclusive 
determinants of the sentence. Our research suggests that prosecutorial 
decisions are important sources of disparity—especially the decision to file 
mandatory minimum charges, which are prosecutors’ most powerful tools for 
constraining judges. Note that we do not claim our findings prove 
“discrimination” by prosecutors or anyone else. We are limited to what our 
data can capture, and unobserved differences between cases could justify 
different charging decisions or sentencing outcomes. Still, we have rich 
controls, including detailed arrest offense information; criminal history; and 
other demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic fields, yet substantial 
unexplained racial differences remain. 
In Part I, we briefly introduce the federal sentencing framework and review 
the legal scholarship on prosecutorial and judicial discretion. In Part II, we 
present our critique of the “sentencing only” approach used by the current 
empirical literature and discuss our preferred process-wide approach, its 
strengths and limitations, and some insights that can be gleaned from it. In 
Part III, we present our critique of the causal inference methods used by 
existing sentencing-reform research. We then pair our process-wide approach 
to estimating disparity with our regression discontinuity-style approach to 
causal inference in order to estimate Booker’s effects on racial disparity. We 
conclude with possible policy implications. 
i .   prosecutors,  sentencing, and the “hydraulic 
discretion” theory 
Federal prosecutors, like their counterparts in the states, have always 
possessed very broad discretion. Prosecutors choose what charges to bring, and 
the complex criminal code often provides a wide range of choices. Over 95% of 
convictions result from guilty pleas, and prosecutors control the terms of the 
deals they offer defendants.17 These can include the charges of conviction 
(charge bargaining), sentence recommendations and requests for departures 
 
Patti B. Saris, Chairwoman, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks at the Public Hearing 
Before the United States Sentencing Commission 8 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc 
.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Hearing 
_Transcript_20120216.pdf. 
17.  See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains Trump Trials, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904435893045 
77637610097206808.html (“Guilty pleas last year resolved 97% of all federal cases that the 
Justice Department prosecuted to a conclusion.”). 
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from the usual range, and stipulations about sentencing-relevant facts (fact 
bargaining). 
Traditionally, prosecutors’ discretion was matched by vast judicial 
discretion in choosing sentences, which was constrained only by broad 
statutory ranges—for instance, zero to twenty years. Statutory minimum 
sentences were not widespread before the 1980s, and still apply in only a 
minority of cases.18 Within the statutory ranges, judges were free to tailor 
sentences to the facts and the offenders’ circumstances. The disadvantage was 
that there was no good way to ensure that similar cases resulted in similar 
sentences. 
In 1984, citing studies finding widespread racial, gender, inter-judge, and 
inter-district disparities in sentencing, Congress adopted the Sentencing 
Reform Act, which created a Sentencing Commission to devise binding 
Sentencing Guidelines.19 Under the Guidelines, complex rules determine the 
offense level, which is based on the conviction offense plus additional 
aggravating or mitigating sentencing facts, such as drug quantity or the 
defendant’s role in a group offense. The offense level is one of two axes of a 
sentencing grid; the other is the defendant’s criminal history category. Within 
each grid cell is a narrow range: eight to fourteen months, for instance.20 Prior 
to Booker, departures from this range were permitted only for specified reasons. 
By greatly reducing judges’ discretion, the Guidelines concentrated 
tremendous power in prosecutors’ hands. As Kate Stith explains, “when judges 
had discretion to impose any sentence [in the statutory range], prosecutorial 
power was potentially limited or counterbalanced by the possibility of judicial 
 
18.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and 
_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties 
/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm (reviewing the history of federal mandatory 
minimums and describing the 1980s “enactment of the mandatory minimums that are most 
commonly applied today”); id. at xxix (finding that only “14.5 percent of all federal 
offenders were subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing,” although—because 
mandatory minimums generally lead to longer sentences—39.4% of federal prisoners had 
been given mandatory minimums). 
19.  See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.); id. § 217(a) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
991) (creating the Sentencing Commission). 
20.  See Sentencing Table, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011 
_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Sentencing_Table.pdf; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2012) (providing the Sentencing Chart in the Guidelines Manual). See 
generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL chs. 2 & 3 (2012) (laying out guidelines by 
offense and describing victim-related sentence adjustments). 
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discretion.”21 But under the Guidelines, plea-bargaining much more tightly 
constrained the sentence.22 The one feature of the Guidelines that was intended 
to limit prosecutorial power was the judge’s sentencing fact-finding authority. 
This system (called “real-offense” sentencing)23 allows the judge to base a 
sentence even on uncharged conduct, so long as the sentence falls within the 
statutory range for the crime of conviction. In principle, this system should 
reduce prosecutors’ ability to offer to understate the defendant’s culpability in 
exchange for a guilty plea. 
Still, studies suggest that real-offense sentencing has not constrained 
prosecutors very much, because in practice prosecutors very strongly influence 
judges’ findings of fact. Plea agreements usually include factual stipulations, 
and, even though DOJ has long directed prosecutors not to bargain over these 
facts, many studies have documented the persistence of fact-bargaining.24 
Judges are not bound by the factual stipulations, and the power to diverge 
from them (relying on sentencing-stage evidence or a probation office report) 
is an important aspect of judicial discretion. Judges typically lack the incentive, 
however, and may lack the information, to diverge from what the parties have 
agreed upon.25 One 1996 survey found that only 8% of judges said they “go 
behind” plea agreements “somewhat or very frequently”; 25% said they never 
do, while the rest said they did so “infrequently.”26 As Nancy King put it, 
 
21.  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1420, 1430 (2008). 
22.  Id. 
23.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4 (2012); Stith, supra note 21, at 1434-36. 
24.  Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on 
Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2006); 
Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 295-98 (2005); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three 
Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 522 (1992); Stith, supra note 21, at 1450. 
25.  See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 24, at 1068-69; Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, 
Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its 
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1300-01 (1997); Stith, supra 
note 21, at 1449; cf. William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 383-
84 (1995) (noting “the frustration of federal judges” with the shift in power to prosecutors 
resulting from the Guidelines). 
26.  Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Results of the 
Federal Judicial Center’s 1996 Survey, FED. JUD. CENTER 10 (1997), https://bulk.resource.org 
/courts.gov/fjc/gssurvey.pdf. 
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“Establishing facts in an adversarial system without the assistance of 
adversaries is an awkward business.”27 
To the Guidelines’ many critics, this empowerment of prosecutors was a 
serious flaw, leading to harsh results for defendants generally and undermining 
the Sentencing Reform Act’s disparity-reduction goals. As Albert Alschuler 
argued, “[T]he price of whatever success the Guidelines have achieved in 
reducing judge-created sentencing disparities has been the burgeoning of 
prosecutor-created disparities.”28 Scholars often refer to discretion in the 
criminal justice system as being “hydraulic,” such that attempts to constrain it 
in one place will merely shift it to another. Stephanos Bibas, for example, 
wrote, “The criminal justice system operates like a toothpaste tube, and 
departures that are squeezed out of the judge’s end of the tube will wind up in 
the prosecutor’s domain. This hydraulic pressure means that departures will 
still exist, but they will now occur more often on prosecutors’ terms.”29 This 
theory has long pervaded scholarship about the Guidelines. As Terance Miethe 
wrote in 1987, “[T]his ‘hydraulic’ or ‘zero-sum’ effect is so firmly entrenched 
as a criticism of current reform efforts that most researchers begin with the 
assumption that the displacement of discretion exists . . . .”30 
Note that, although scholars’ language often refers to shifts in “discretion,” 
this is a slight misnomer; the Guidelines did not really increase prosecutors’ 
discretion, which was already almost boundless. Rather, they increased their 
power: the choices prosecutors made more conclusively determined the 
sentence.31 In a 1996 survey, approximately 75% of district judges and chief 
probation officers said that prosecutors were now the actors with the most 
influence on final sentences—more than judges themselves.32 Prosecutors 
thereby obtained greater leverage in plea-bargaining—they could nearly 
promise that defendants would get more lenient sentences if they pled guilty 
and harsher ones if they refused. In 2004, Marc Miller wrote, “The 
overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system . . . is the 
 
27.  King, supra note 24, at 303. 
28.  Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 117 (2005). 
29.  Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea 
Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 300 (2004); accord Stith, supra note 21, at  
1427-36 (describing the Guidelines’ shift of power from judges to prosecutors). 
30.  Miethe, supra note 10, at 155-56. 
31.  See Rodney L. Engen, Assessing Determinate and Presumptive Sentencing—Making Research 
Relevant, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 323, 328-29 (2009). 
32.  Johnson & Gilbert, supra note 26, at 6-7. 
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virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors . . . . There is a lot of 
evidence to support this claim, but it can be demonstrated with one simple and 
awesome fact: Everyone pleads guilty.”33 After the implementation of the 
Guidelines in the early 1990s, plea rates rose from 87% of all federal 
convictions to 97% by 2004.34 
Since then, however, federal sentencing law has undergone another major 
change. In January 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 
which rendered the formerly mandatory Guidelines merely advisory.35 The 
Court held that a mandatory sentencing scheme in which a defendant’s 
maximum sentence could be increased based on judicial fact-finding violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.36 The Court could have remedied 
that defect by requiring more jury fact-finding, but it chose an alternate 
remedy: maintaining real-offense sentencing, but severing the provision of the 
Sentencing Reform Act that rendered the Guidelines mandatory.37 The Court’s 
remedial choice remains reversible by Congress,38 which has so far not taken 
action to reverse Booker. District courts today may depart from the Guidelines 
so long as the ultimate sentence is not “unreasonable.”39 In December 2007, in 
Gall v. United States and Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court further 
clarified that courts of appeals should not deem sentences unreasonable merely 
because they fall outside the Guidelines,40 and that sentencing judges may 
depart from the Guidelines on the basis of policy disagreements.41 
 
33.  Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 
1252 (2004). 
34.  Alschuler, supra note 28, at 112; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE 
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM iv (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/Research 
_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study_full.pdf 
(explaining that, although the Guidelines were promulgated in 1987, they were not fully 
implemented until after Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)); see also Stith, supra 
note 21, at 1425 (arguing that the Guidelines “provided prosecutors with indecent power 
relative to both defendants and judges, in large part because of prosecutors’ ability to 
threaten full application of the severe Sentencing Guidelines”). 
35.  543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
36.  Id. at 232. 
37.  Id. at 247-48. 
38.  Id. at 265 (noting that “[t]he ball now lies in Congress’ court”). 
39.  Id. at 261. 
40.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
41.  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108-09 (2007); see also Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 354-55 (2007) (barring appellate courts from treating outside-Guidelines sentences 
as presumptively unreasonable). 
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Booker was widely seen as an earthquake in federal sentencing law. Still, 
rendering the Guidelines advisory is not the same as eliminating them. Federal 
judges are still required to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range, and, 
although they are then free to depart from it, they usually do not.42 There are 
many possible reasons for this continued conformity: federal judges might 
believe that the Guidelines meet the goal of reducing disparity,43 wish to avoid 
open-ended, subjective sentencing assessments, seek insulation from criticism 
or reversal, or simply treat the Guidelines as an “anchor.”44 
To the extent that judges continue to follow the Guidelines, the power the 
Guidelines conferred on prosecutors will presumably remain largely intact. In 
addition, even if judges felt totally unconstrained by the Guidelines, 
prosecutors would retain at least two powerful sources of sentencing influence. 
First, their charging and charge-bargaining choices shape the statutory 
minimum and maximum sentences, which remain mandatory. Second, because 
they negotiate the factual stipulations accompanying pleas and may introduce 
evidence at sentencing hearings, prosecutors have enormous influence over the 
information that gets to judges, and what judges know presumably will 
influence sentencing regardless of whether they follow the Guidelines. Thus, 
even in the post-Booker era, prosecutors should be expected to play a crucial 
role in the processes that shape sentencing. 
In short, then, legal scholars and justice system participants widely agree 
both that prosecutorial choices are key drivers of sentences and that sentencing 
law reforms involve tradeoffs between judicial and prosecutorial power. One 
might expect that this broad consensus would shape empirical research on 
 
42.  Most federal sentences are still in the Guidelines range. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 3, 5 (finding that in the period between December 11, 2007 
and September 30, 2011, “80.7 percent of federal sentences were either within the guideline 
range (53.9% of sentences) or below the range due to a government motion (26.8% of 
sentences)”). 
43.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES ch. 2 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects 
/Surveys/200303_Judge_Survey/jschap2.pdf (showing that 52.8% of surveyed judges, when 
asked to rate the Guidelines’ performance in reducing disparities on a 1 to 6 scale, picked 
either 5 or 6). 
44.  The “anchoring” literature shows that when people have to translate subjective judgments 
onto a numeric scale, they are often highly influenced by hearing some number 
mentioned—even numbers that (unlike the Guidelines) are actually irrelevant to the 
question posed. See J. J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making 
After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 326 (discussing “anchoring problems” 
in mock jury studies of punitive damages awards and criminal jury verdicts). 
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sentencing disparities and sentencing reforms, but, as we demonstrate below, it 
has not. 
i i .  estimating racial disparity in sentencing: a process-
wide approach 
For decades, unwarranted disparities in sentencing have been a major focus 
of empirical research. Overwhelmingly, these studies focus exclusively on 
judges’ final sentencing decisions, ignoring the rest of the justice process. In 
Section II.A, we review those studies and explain why this problem is so 
serious. In Section II.B, we describe the dataset that we constructed to enable a 
broader approach, and in Section II.C, we highlight certain key findings of our 
recent study of racial disparity in charging and sentencing. In Section II.D, we 
discuss some limitations of this broader approach. Note that this Part does not 
focus directly on Booker’s effects or on changes over time. Rather, we begin by 
explaining why it is crucial for estimates of sentencing disparity to encompass 
the pre-sentencing stages of the process: a great deal of the ultimate sentence 
gap between similar black and white arrestees appears to emerge from 
decisions made at earlier stages. That insight provides one of the primary 
motivations for our approach in our analysis of Booker, presented in Part III. 
A.  Studies Estimating the Extent of Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities 
Sentencing disparity studies generally begin by pointing to a gap in 
observed sentence outcomes and asking what generated it. For instance, black 
male defendants receive much longer sentences on average than white males 
do—a major contributor to their higher incarceration rates. But does the 
sentence gap arise because black defendants have committed more serious 
crimes or have more extensive criminal histories? Or are they treated 
differently in the criminal justice process? 
Mass incarceration of black males has serious social consequences 
regardless of its causes. But if different offending patterns are to blame, the 
problem might be better addressed with policies focused on addressing the 
causes of crime, such as poverty. In contrast, if the criminal justice system is 
treating like cases differently, then policymakers should focus on fixing that 
problem. Researchers thus seek to isolate the component of the sentence gap 
arising in the criminal justice process by controlling for some measure of the 
underlying severity of the case. But what measure? The answer to that question 
is the key difference between our approach and those of prior sentencing 
studies. 
When researchers focus on the federal courts or other guidelines-based 
systems, the typical approach is to control for the “presumptive” or 
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recommended guidelines sentence—generally, the bottom end of the 
guidelines range.45 There are variations on this approach,46 but all of them 
estimate differences in the actual sentence relative to what the sentence “should 
have been” under the guidelines. Most studies also include controls for the 
statutory mandatory minimum.47 Studies in systems without guidelines 
similarly control for conviction severity.48 
The problem with these approaches is that the key control variables are 
only distant proxies for the seriousness of the underlying conduct. They are the 
end product of the discretionary processes described above: charging, plea-
bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding. And those processes might also 
produce disparities. The use of these control variables filters out the share of 
the ultimate sentencing disparity that comes from those earlier processes. The 
resulting measure of disparity is thus based on an artificially narrow focus on 
the final sentencing decision in isolation from all the other processes that 
produce the sentence. These estimates can be useful in understanding 
disparities in guidelines compliance, which is one important part of the 
criminal process. However, we believe that, for most purposes, policymakers 
likely have a broader interest in the full sentence disparity that an individual 
faces, regardless of where it originally arose in the justice process. If so, it is 
important for them to understand that the existing literature is estimating 
something much narrower. 
The specification of an empirical model of disparity may seem like a purely 
scientific decision. But as Albert Alschuler has observed, it is bound up with 
 
45.  See, e.g., 2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, app. A, at A-4 to A-5 tbl.A 
(comparing imposed and presumptive sentences); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in 
the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1077, 1088-90 (2011) (following this approach and also 
reviewing prior literature doing the same). 
46.  See, e.g., Brian Iannacchione & Jeremy D. Ball, The Effect of Blakely v. Washington on 
Upward Departures in a Sentencing Guidelines State, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 419, 420-21 & 
tbl.1 (2008) (treating upward departures as the outcome variable); David B. Mustard, 
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 285, 297 (2001) (including separate dummy variables for each Guidelines grid 
cell); Jeffrey S. Nowacki, Race, Ethnicity, and Judicial Discretion: The Influence of the United 
States v. Booker Decision, 20 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 12-13 (2013) (using offense level and 
criminal history controls); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: 
The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 63 & tbl.1 (2005) 
(same). 
47.  E.g., Nowacki, supra note 46, at 12-13. 
48.  E.g., Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 
420 (1993) (using a ten-point severity scale). 
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normative questions: what kinds of disparities do we think are important?49 
The choice of control variables determines what kinds of disparities one is 
measuring, and so it should be shaped by a sense of the types of disparities 
policymakers and stakeholders care about. There are many reasons one might 
worry about demographic disparities in the justice process. For instance, such 
disparities might violate the Equal Protection Clause, exacerbate the social 
consequences of mass incarceration within particular communities, interfere 
with retributive or utilitarian punishment objectives, or undermine the justice 
system’s credibility. 
We do not intend in this Article to resolve what policymakers’ objectives 
should be. But none of the reasons we can think of for caring about 
demographic disparities suggest that policymakers should confine their interest 
to equalizing sentences for cases in the same Guidelines cell. Rather, all imply 
that the key question is whether people who have committed the same 
underlying criminal conduct (arguably including prior criminal history) receive 
the same sentence. Between the underlying criminal conduct and the sentence, 
there are many points in the process where disparities could be introduced. 
Policymakers should care about all of them. 
Other scholars have noted this problem with the prevailing approach.50 
This includes, to their credit, many of those who employ the approach 
themselves, who note that their accounts of disparities are incomplete.51 But 
these caveats generally are not mentioned when the work gets cited, and their 
importance may well be overlooked by policymakers. This is a serious mistake. 
The problem is not just that these accounts of disparity are insufficiently 
comprehensive—they are also potentially misleading, at least if one 
misinterprets them as a measure of whether judges are treating defendants 
with similar conduct equally. Absent an account of disparity at the earlier 
stages of the process, it is difficult to interpret disparities found in the final 
stage. 
 
49.  Alschuler, supra note 28, at 85-88. 
50.  See id. at 86-87; Engen, supra note 31, at 324-29; Shermer & Johnson, supra note 10, at 395-
96. 
51.  See, e.g., Ulmer et al., supra note 45, at 1107-08. The Sentencing Commission itself notes in 
the 2012 update to its analysis that prosecutorial practices could contribute to sentencing 
disparities, but it does not connect this insight to its race results, nor does it alter its 
methods of estimating racial disparity to correct any of the problems identified here with its 
earlier report. See 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 7-8. In this Article, 
we focus principally on the 2010 report, which explained its methods of assessing racial 
disparity in much more detail. 
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For instance, consider the Sentencing Commission’s prominent recent 
sentencing-disparity report. The report finds that from December 2007 to 
September 2011, black males received 19.5% longer sentences than white males, 
controlling among other things for the recommended Guidelines sentence.52 
But how should this result be interpreted? Consider just three of many 
possibilities concerning what might have happened earlier in the justice 
process: 
A.   Prosecutors charged white defendants more harshly and/or offered 
them worse plea deals, such that the resulting Guidelines 
recommendation averaged 19.5% higher for white defendants than 
for black defendants with similar offenses and criminal histories. 
B.   Prosecutors charged white defendants more harshly and/or offered 
them worse plea deals, such that the resulting Guidelines 
recommendation averaged 30% higher for white defendants than 
for black defendants with similar offenses and criminal histories.  
C.   Prosecutors charged black defendants more harshly and/or offered 
them worse plea deals, such that the resulting Guidelines 
recommendation averaged 30% higher for black defendants than 
for white defendants with similar offenses and criminal histories. 
Under Scenario A, what looked like a 19.5% sentencing disparity now looks like 
judges sentencing more or less “correctly,” relative to underlying criminal 
conduct—they are correcting the disparity introduced by prosecutors. Under 
Scenario B, it actually seems that judges are not favoring white defendants 
enough—to sentence based on true culpability, they would have to do more to 
compensate for prosecutors favoring black defendants. In contrast, under 
Scenario C, judges are compounding the underlying charging and plea-
bargaining disparities; the “true” sentencing disparity is actually much more 
than 19.5%. If you don’t know which of these scenarios (or others) is true, it is 
risky to use the 19.5% figure as a guide to policy. 
Moreover, even if one were willing to assume that judges were the only 
relevant source of racial disparity in sentencing, the prevailing method would 
nonetheless be too limited, because it still filters out part of the judicial 
sentencing process. Controlling for the presumptive sentence means one is 
filtering out any disparities in judicial fact-finding. And in the Sentencing 
Commission studies specifically, the problem is even worse. In addition to the 
presumptive sentence and mandatory minimum, the Commission also controls 
 
52.  2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. E, at 9. 
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for whether the judge departed upward or downward from the Guidelines 
range. In doing so, the Commission is not just considering the final sentencing 
decision in isolation—it is filtering out a key part of that sentencing decision 
itself. In effect, the Commission is estimating race gaps in the size of departures 
(and in sentence choices within the narrow Guidelines range), but filtering out 
whether there is a departure and, if so, in what direction. This is, to say the 
least, a strange choice, and one that could easily produce misleading results. 
This same problem also appears in the most prominent recent study 
responding to the Sentencing Commission report, that of Ulmer, Light, and 
Kramer; the authors critique other aspects of the Commission’s methods, but 
their main analysis of sentencing disparities also controls for departure status 
as well as the presumptive sentence.53 
Another recent study by Joshua Fischman and Max Schanzenbach 
recognizes the problem with the presumptive sentence approach (and also does 
not control for departure status).54 Fischman and Schanzenbach instead control 
for the Guidelines “base offense level.” This is an improvement over the 
presumptive sentence approach; it provides a fuller measure of judicial 
sentencing disparity, and is probably the best approach possible using only the 
sentencing-stage data from the Sentencing Commission. But it still means that 
the authors’ sentence disparity estimates do not incorporate components 
introduced by the various prosecutorial decisions and negotiations, plus judicial 
fact-finding, that determine the base offense level.55 The base offense level is 
affected not only by charging and charge-bargaining, but also by a large part of 
the fact-finding required by the Guidelines. It incorporates, for instance, drug 
quantity in a drug trafficking case,56 or, in an assault case, the degree of 
physical contact and injury, the defendant’s intent, and the use of weapons.57 
 
53.  See Ulmer et al., supra note 45. This study does consider downward departure rates 
separately as an outcome variable, and finds substantial racial disparity in those rates 
(favoring white defendants). Id. That disparity in departure rates is filtered out of the 
sentence length disparity estimates, however, which presumably biases them downward. 
Similarly, the Sentencing Commission’s recent update to its analysis also assesses non-
government-sponsored departure rates as an outcome and likewise finds a disparity favoring 
white defendants, but continues to filter that disparity out of the sentence length estimates. 
2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. E, 20-22. 
54.  Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 729 (2012). 
55.  Id. at 754 tbl.5 (listing controls). 
56.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2012). 
57.  Id. § 2A2.2, 2A2.4. 
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Sentence disparities arising from any of those factual determinations, or in the 
prior charging or plea-bargaining processes, would be filtered out by the use of 
the base offense level control. To fully avoid the limitations of the presumptive 
sentence approach, one needs a measure of case severity that precedes all of 
these discretionary processes.58 
The problem with the presumptive sentence control is compounded by a 
distinct source of potential bias that the existing literature has overwhelmingly 
failed to acknowledge: sample selection shaping the pool of sentenced cases. 
Nearly every study of sentencing disparity is confined to a sample consisting of 
sentenced defendants only—in federal court studies, typically only those 
sentenced for felonies or Class A misdemeanors (“non-petty offenses”), which 
the Sentencing Commission collects data on. To make it into the sample, 
defendants must get through the criminal justice “funnel”: they must be 
arrested, charged, and convicted of a non-petty offense. 
If these earlier processes are subject to demographic disparities, it could 
introduce sample selection bias into the estimates of sentencing-stage disparity. 
Suppose that all else equal, black defendants are more likely to be convicted of 
a non-petty offense, such that it takes a less serious case to get a black 
defendant sentenced. If so, we would expect black defendants and white 
defendants who get sentenced to be unobservably different: black defendants’ 
cases would be less serious in a way that controlling for observable variables 
cannot capture. Sentencing disparity estimates within that sample would be 
biased because they cannot account for this unobserved difference. Again, 
 
58.  In one portion of their analysis—the assessment of the effects of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Gall and Kimbrough on sentencing disparities—Fischman and Schanzenbach 
also present alternative results without the base offense level control. Fischman & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 54, at 756 tbl.6. But without the base offense level control, there 
are no controls for the severity of the underlying cases. That approach is plausibly valid for 
the purposes of their assessment of these Supreme Court decisions’ effects if one makes the 
strong assumption that the underlying case mix did not change in racially disparate ways 
during their three-and-a-half-year study period. But the approach cannot be used for our 
purpose here, which is to disentangle the share of the observed racial disparity that appears 
to be explained by differences in underlying criminal conduct from the share that appears to 
be introduced in the criminal process. It also does not identify the overall magnitude of the 
disparity or the proportion of it that is attributable to judges, the key figure for recent policy 
debates. For that purpose, it is not sufficient simply to drop the problematic controls—one 
must replace them with a better measure of the severity of the underlying case. As we 
explain below, we believe the arrest offense is the best available measure. Note that 
Fischman and Schanzenbach explicitly explain that they do not seek to assess the amount of 
disparity that is unwarranted by legitimate case differences; they focus only on change over 
time. Id. at 738-39. Some further differences with their approach are discussed in Part III. 
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without assessing the “funnel,” one cannot know whether to expect such a bias 
to exist and, if it does, which direction it will cut. 
Unfortunately, the empirical research on demographic disparities earlier in 
the justice process is relatively limited. It focuses almost entirely on certain 
measures of charge-bargaining, such as the rate of dropping charges; studies 
typically do not assess severity reductions.59 More importantly, few studies (and 
no federal studies) have assessed disparities in initial charging, even though it 
is difficult to interpret charge-bargaining results without doing so.60 A few 
state-level studies have found racial disparities in the use of certain particularly 
harsh mandatory minimums, including one study of “habitual offender” 
charges in Florida,61 another in Pennsylvania,62 and a Maryland study of add-
on mandatory minimums for firearms.63 
At the federal level, many observers, including the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, have pointed to racial gaps in the rate of mandatory minimum 
convictions.64 Fischman and Schanzenbach’s study provides useful new 
evidence that mandatory minimums may be an important contributor to 
sentencing disparities.65 But these studies raise important further questions. 
Because they do not control for underlying pre-charge case features affecting a 
defendant’s eligibility for mandatory minimums (such as the arrest offense), 
they do not examine the reasons for the mandatory minimum gap. They do not 
tell us whether black defendants have simply committed more crimes to which 
 
59.  See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 10, at 398-401, 414-21 (reviewing the charge-bargaining 
literature, which mostly finds disparity favoring white defendants, and presenting their own 
findings showing no such disparity). 
60.  One early study by Spohn et al. found disparities favoring white defendants in the rate of 
filing felony charges in Los Angeles County, but did not analyze charge severity within 
felony charges. Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the 
Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987); see also sources cited 
supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing another charging study). 
61.  Charles Crawford et al., Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of Habitual Offenders, 36 
CRIMINOLOGY 481 (1998). 
62.  Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427 (2007). 
63.  Jill Farrell, Mandatory Minimum Firearm Penalties: A Source of Sentencing Disparity?, 5 JUST. 
RES. & POL’Y 95 (2003). 
64.  2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6; see also Disparate Impact of Federal Mandatory 
Minimums on Minority Communities in the United States, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS & NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.nclr.org/images 
/uploads/publications/38367_file_IAHRC_statement_FNLNWQC__2__fnl.pdf. 
65.  See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 54. 
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mandatory minimums apply, or whether there are racial disparities in 
prosecutors’ exercise of charging or charge-bargaining discretion.66 
A final disadvantage to the “presumptive sentence” approach is simpler: it 
controls only for differences in crime severity according to the Guidelines, not 
for differences in crime type. Judges might be more likely to depart from the 
Guidelines for some crimes than others, for reasons that have nothing to do 
with race. Such tendencies might well have racially disparate impacts, but they 
are not necessarily “unwarranted”—the nature of the offense is certainly a 
relevant sentencing consideration. Sentencing studies often do include controls 
for case type in addition to the presumptive sentence, but only for broad 
categories such as drugs or violent crime, which do not capture much nuance.67 
More precise crime-type controls, which we provide, can enable us to better 
distinguish the disparate impact component of racial disparity (the component 
that can be explained by non-racial factors like case type) from the component 
that we cannot explain with the variables we can measure, which could 
represent disparate treatment on the basis of race. The distinction between 
disparate impact and disparate treatment is crucial as a matter of constitutional 
law,68 although the extent to which it is normatively important is open to 
debate.69 We think all factors contributing to racial disparity in sentencing—
 
66.  One study of Illinois courts evaluates whether judges differ from one another in their racial 
disparity patterns, finding that they do. See David Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their 
Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012). That study does not need to control for 
“presumptive sentence” because it can take advantage of the random assignment of cases to 
judges. The result interestingly shows that judicial discretion matters to racial disparity 
patterns. However, it does not answer the more basic question of whether judges are 
actually treating similar defendants differently based on race, as opposed to varying in their 
treatment of case features correlated with race. Similarly, studies that evaluate the 
interaction between the race and gender of judges or prosecutors and those of defendants 
also provide interesting insights, but cannot squarely address whether or how race or gender 
affects outcomes. See Amy Farrell et al., Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal Sentencing: 
Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 85 (2010); Schanzenbach, supra note 46. 
67.  See, e.g., 2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, at B1-B2 (using seven categories); 
Ulmer et al., supra note 45, at 1090. 
68.  Facially neutral government policies and practices will not be deemed unconstitutional 
unless those challenging them can establish a discriminatory purpose. See Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
69.  Many critics have argued that the Supreme Court’s focus on discriminatory purpose is 
overly formalistic and have instead advocated a focus on the harms imposed on 
subordinated groups. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights 
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2004) 
(reviewing this literature). We are sympathetic to this view, but this longstanding debate 
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whether legally warranted or not—are important for policymakers to 
understand, a point we return to below. But we believe that disentangling the 
reasons can help policymakers figure out what to do about them. In any event, 
studies like the Sentencing Commission’s purport to estimate legally 
unwarranted disparities, and thus they should filter out legally relevant factors 
like case type. 
B.  Our Dataset 
Our broader approach to the estimation of racial disparities requires 
something most researchers have not had: a dataset that traces federal cases 
from arrest through sentencing. We constructed it by linking files from four 
federal agencies: the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) (data from arrest and/or 
booking), the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) (prosecutors’ 
investigation and case files), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(AOUSC) (court records), and the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) 
(sentencing-related data collected from judges).70 It covers two stages of the 
process that the Sentencing Commission data alone (the sole source for most 
federal studies) do not include. 
First, our dataset includes the arrest offense, coded with 430 codes, and a 
text field describing the offense based on the arresting officer’s notes. This 
information allows us to substitute the arrest offense, instead of the 
presumptive sentence, as the key case-severity control. This substitution means 
that we are estimating sentencing gaps between black and white defendants 
who look similar near the beginning of the justice process, rather than between 
those whose cases have come to look similar near the end of it. We can thus 
estimate the aggregate sentencing disparity introduced by decisions 
throughout the post-arrest justice process. In addition, the arrest offense codes 
provide far more detail on crime type than sentencing studies typically control 
for. The arrest offense is not a perfect proxy for underlying criminal activity, to 
be sure. We discuss its limitations below.71 
 
need not be resolved for our purposes; empirical differentiation of the reasons for disparities 
has practical uses regardless. 
70.  These data are collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and made available to researchers 
under security conditions by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. We provide 
much greater detail on the construction and coding of the dataset in Rehavi & Starr, supra 
note 9, Data App. For more information on the data restrictions and on accessing the data, 
see Restricted Data, NAT’L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUST. DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu 
/icpsrweb/NACJD/private (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
71.  See infra Subsections II.D.1, II.D.3. 
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Second, our dataset includes rich information on initial charges, in addition 
to final charges. Specifically, we know the statutory sections under which the 
defendant was charged and convicted—for instance, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).72 To 
assess charges quantitatively, we translated each combination of statutory 
sections into a numeric measure of total charge severity. This is not a simple 
task, which may be an additional reason prosecutorial decision-making is 
under-researched. Based on comprehensive research on every federal crime 
charged during the study period, we developed four different charge severity 
measures. The first three were grounded in sentencing law: the statutory 
maximum and minimum and a Guidelines-based measure.73 The fourth 
measure was based on sentencing practice: the mean sentence given in a 
baseline period before the study period. We then calculated the combined 
severity of all charges on all these measures, following the rule laid out in the 
Guidelines for sentencing in multi-charge cases: we assumed sentences on each 
charge would run concurrently, unless one of the statutes specified consecutive 
sentencing.74 
Sometimes, the statutory provisions in the data contained multiple 
sentencing schemes depending on the facts of the case; even more often, the 
Guidelines sentence would vary according to the facts. Where possible, we 
resolved such ambiguities based on the other charges in the case; often, the 
presence of a second charge would make it evident that the prosecutor was 
alleging a particular fact that would affect the sentence on the first charge.75 In 
 
72.  This section contains the sentencing enhancement for firearms. 
73.  The statutory maximum and minimum were simply looked up in the listed statutes, 
although there were sometimes ambiguities to be resolved, as discussed below. The 
Guidelines measure is more complicated, because a Guidelines sentence normally is not 
determined based on the statutory charge alone—it depends on additional fact-finding. The 
measure we used is the Guidelines sentence that would apply if all of the statutory elements 
of all charged offenses were proven, but no other aggravating or mitigating facts were 
proven at sentencing. It is thus intentionally limited to serve as a “charge only” measure, 
allowing the effects of subsequent Guidelines sentencing fact-finding to be separated out 
from those of initial charging. 
74.  Thus, in a two-charge case, unless one of the two statutes specified consecutive sentencing, 
all of the combined charge severity measures would be determined by the higher of the two 
individual-charge severities that we calculated. If one of the statutes required consecutive 
sentencing, then the severities would be summed. Note, however, that the presence of the 
less severe charge still might be important, because it might affect the severity that we 
calculated for the more severe charge. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
75.  For instance, if Charge 1 contained a heightened penalty (under either the statute or the 
Guidelines) if a gun was involved and Charge 2 was a gun charge, we applied the 
heightened penalty for Charge 1. Implementing this analysis required extensive legal 
research. In addition to coding all the triggering conditions for statutory or Guidelines 
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other cases, we used reasonable, research-driven assumptions about which 
subparagraphs were likely to apply to most cases brought under that statute.76 
However, in drug cases, the ambiguities were too extreme to resolve with these 
methods—most cases were charged under omnibus provisions (such as 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)) encompassing all drug types and quantities. We could not 
meaningfully code the severity of such provisions, and thus cannot assess 
initial charging disparities in drug cases. It is still possible, however, to analyze 
drug cases focusing on disparities in the final mandatory minimum recorded at 
sentencing, a separate data field. Child pornography cases must also be 
excluded from initial-charging analyses because of a similar ambiguity, but 
they can likewise be included in analyses of the final mandatory minimum.77 
We also excluded immigration cases for different reasons: their stakes typically 
turn on deportation, making prison sentence length analysis a very incomplete 
picture of case outcomes, and they involve different “fast-track” procedural 
environments, which present different policy considerations and also raise 
concerns about the quality of data.78 
We focused on the race gap between black and white U.S. citizen males. In 
a separate study focused on gender disparity, discussed below, Starr also 
 
sentencing enhancements for all federal crimes, we also had to code every crime’s elements 
to identify possible factors that could raise the penalty for any other charge in the case. More 
details on the way we carried out this coding can be found in Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, 
Data App. 
76.  For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, the federal health care fraud statute, has a statutory 
maximum of ten years, but this is increased to twenty years if the fraud results in serious 
bodily injury and to life if it results in death. A search of case law involving this statute 
confirmed our intuition that these enhancements are used in only a small fraction of cases, 
so our default assumption, absent the presence of other charges with elements including 
serious bodily injury of death, was that the statutory maximum for this crime was ten years. 
For more discussion of our assumptions, see Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, Data App. 
77.  As discussed below, in our analysis of overall sentencing disparities as well as the final 
mandatory minimum, the results were fairly similar when we added drug and child 
pornography cases to the sample (though the unexplained racial disparities are somewhat 
larger in drug cases). 
78.  The Sentencing Commission’s Booker study includes immigration, but we agree with other 
scholars who have argued that it should be considered separately. See, e.g., Ulmer et al., 
supra note 45, at 1085-86. Note that the exclusion of immigration cases probably should not 
be expected to have dramatic effects on black-white disparities because there are few black 
defendants in immigration cases. For instance, in the Sentencing Commission’s 2009 
dataset, less than 2% of sentenced immigration defendants were black. In any event, we 
leave the analysis of immigration cases for another day, and note that other disparities—
such as national origin disparities—might be of particular policy interest in the immigration 
context. 
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assessed the race gap among women.79 Outcomes for other racial groups were 
not analyzed because their numbers were very small. Hispanic defendants are 
included among the black and white defendants.80 
C.  Our Research on Racial Disparities in Charging and Sentencing: Some Key 
Findings 
Our research on the disparities introduced throughout the post-arrest 
justice process, and their procedural sources, gives us strong reason to believe 
that the concerns expressed above about sentencing-stage-only estimates are 
problematic in practice as well as theory. We intend in future research to assess 
the specific contribution of every major stage of the justice process, but we 
began by focusing on initial charging and its role in explaining sentencing 
disparities. This stage has been almost entirely ignored by existing research, 
and it is especially important. In most federal cases, the initial charge is the 
final charge; charge-bargaining is the exception, not the rule.81 In this period, 
dropping charges once filed required a supervisor’s special approval.82 In initial 
charging, however, the line prosecutor had, and has, considerable discretion.83 
In addition, before one can even begin to make sense of plea-bargaining 
disparities, one has to first know whether the baseline charges already reflect 
disparities. 
 
79.  Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases 16 (Univ. of Mich. Law 
Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-018, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2144002. 
80.  The USMS data do not identify Hispanic ethnicity. Among sentenced defendants, the 
Sentencing Commission’s data show that almost all persons of Hispanic ethnicity identify as 
white. If outcomes for Hispanic defendants fall somewhere between those of black and non-
Hispanic white defendants (as 2010 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23 suggests 
for the time period most closely corresponding to that of our sample), then our disparity 
estimates will be somewhat smaller than one would find if one looked only at black versus 
non-Hispanic white defendants. 
81.  Overall charge severity was reduced in only 10-15% of the cases in our sample (varying 
depending on the severity measure), and in 85% of cases there was no change to the charge 
labeled the “lead charge” (the most serious charge) in the AOUSC data. 
82.  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors, Department 
Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing 
(Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
83.  DOJ also attempted to constrain charging discretion, id., but this is a weaker constraint in 
practice, as we explain infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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The statistical analysis and the resulting estimates are described in detail in 
the study.84 Here, we highlight some key findings and focus on their 
implications for legal policy and for assessing the impact of Booker. We had 
three main research questions: 
1.   Do prosecutors charge otherwise-similar black and white arrestees 
differently? 
2.   Do otherwise-similar black and white arrestees ultimately receive 
different sentences? 
3.   How much of the sentencing disparity can be explained by the 
charging disparity? 
By “otherwise similar,” we mean similar in terms of the pre-charge case and 
defendant characteristics that we can observe. In the charging analysis 
(Question 1), we controlled for arrest offense; district; age; whether there were 
multiple defendants in the case; and county-level poverty, unemployment, 
income, and crime statistics. In the sentencing analysis (Questions 2 and 3), we 
added additional controls based on data recorded only for sentenced 
defendants: criminal history category and education level. Other variables were 
available only for subsets of the sample, but we checked to make sure that 
within those subsets, the results did not change when they were taken into 
account. These included defense counsel type, marital status, and Hispanic 
ethnicity, as well as dummy variables for whether certain facts were recorded in 
the written arrest offense description: possession of guns, other weapons, or 
drugs; conspiracy; racketeering; child victims; and official victims. For all three 
questions, we used a sample limited to male U.S. citizens.85 
On Question (1), we did find significant racial disparities in charge severity 
across all four charging measures. The racial gaps were fairly moderate (less 
than 10%), but significant.86 But the disparities in mandatory minimums were 
much more dramatic. After controlling for the variables above, we found black 
 
84.  See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, at 13-15, 24. The full analysis includes, for example, an 
exploration of the marginal effects of race at different points in the charging and sentencing 
distributions—that is, whether the racial disparities are larger for more or less severe cases—
as well as a variety of alternative specifications and estimation strategies. The results 
discussed here are from the cited working paper version. Note that the figures may differ in 
the final version due to adjustments to the specification and sample; however, the results 
should not be substantively different. 
85.  In a separate study of gender disparity, Starr also explores racial disparities among female 
defendants. See Starr, supra note 79. 
86.  Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, at 12. 
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men were still nearly twice as likely to be charged with an offense carrying a 
mandatory minimum sentence.87 
Question (2) focuses on the aggregate sentencing disparity introduced by 
the entire post-arrest justice process. Among those convicted there were 
significant unexplained sentencing disparities favoring white defendants. Most 
of the large raw sentencing gap (which was around 50%) could be explained by 
the observed case and defendant characteristics—that is, the gap declined 
substantially when we added the controls to the model. We then used 
decomposition methods to identify which controls were the most important in 
explaining the raw sentencing gap. The factors that could explain by far the 
largest components of the black-white gap were arrest offense and criminal 
history. But even after controlling for these and other variables, a gap of about 
10% remained unexplained in the main sample, which excluded drug and child 
pornography cases.88 The gap was a bit larger in the sample that included drug 
and child pornography cases (such that the sample consisted of all non-
immigration case types). Thus, like other studies, our analysis found 
significant unexplained racial disparities in sentences. 
However, our analysis of Question (3) showed that these gaps do not 
appear to be solely (or even principally) driven by the final sentencing decision. 
Rather, initial charging—especially the decision to bring mandatory minimum 
charges—is an important driver of these sentencing disparities. Half of the 10% 
otherwise-unexplained sentence gap in the main sample disappeared when we 
controlled for mandatory minimum charges.89 Furthermore, that estimate 
almost certainly understates the impact of mandatory minimum charges 
because of the very conservative coding method we used—when our charge 
information was ambiguous, we assumed there was no mandatory minimum, 
which means we missed a substantial number of them.90 When we instead 
controlled for the final mandatory minimum sentence (which is unaffected by 
 
87.  Id. at 11-12. 
88.  Id. at 3. 
89.  Id. 
90.  See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing charging ambiguities). Mandatory 
minimums are fairly frequently triggered by special factual allegations—such as injury, 
death, or prior commission of the same crime—that the charge data do not identify. A 
comparison of our coding of the final mandatory minimum to the actual final mandatory 
minimum recorded by the judge suggests that our initial charge coding is probably missing 
nearly 40% of the mandatory minimums. Our coding of ambiguous cases was deliberately 
conservative—that is, we chose to err on the side of understating mandatory minimums’ 
role. 
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the coding ambiguities, because it is recorded by the sentencing judge), all the 
otherwise-unexplained racial disparity in the average sentence disappeared.91 
We performed this latter analysis for drug cases and child pornography 
cases as well; this was possible because it did not require using the ambiguous 
initial charge data. In a sample consisting of all non-immigration case types, 
including drug and child pornography cases, no significant disparity remained 
after controlling for the final mandatory minimum.92 In short, the results when 
one includes drug and child pornography cases are consistent with the results 
when one excludes them: a substantial black-white gap that is unexplained by 
the control variables, but which appears to be driven largely by differences in 
the use of mandatory minimums.93 
We subjected all of these findings to a battery of robustness checks to 
assess whether varying the control variables, the sample definition, or the 
estimation method changed the results. Similar disparity patterns appeared in 
all specifications and subsamples. Mandatory minimum charging disparities 
were similar across offense types, but the non-drug mandatory minimum that 
was the most common and the most responsible for driving sentencing 
disparities was the enhancement for crimes involving firearms, found in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c). This statute has particularly harsh penalties: at least five 
years, running consecutively to other charges. There are higher minimums if 
the firearm is brandished or discharged and astonishing minimums (at least 
thirty years) if there is more than one § 924(c) count, which could simply mean 
that the defendant was found with two guns.94 Prosecutors have considerable 
discretion in applying this statute, especially when the facts make the 
relationship of a gun to an offense ambiguous (for instance, when the gun is 
found in the defendant’s car trunk), and a lenient prosecutor may “swallow the 
 
91.  Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, at 19-20. This difference reflects the coding issue, not new 
disparities introduced by charge-bargaining. Our analyses (using our coding for both the 
initial and final charges) do not show racial disparities in the rate at which mandatory 
minimums are dropped during plea-bargaining. 
92.  Id. at 20-21. 
93.  In its recent report, the Sentencing Commission criticizes our working paper for excluding 
drug trafficking cases but makes no mention of the additional analyses showing that the 
results are similar in those cases. See 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. E, at 
13 n.25. Note, in any event, that the Booker analysis, infra Part III, which is a more direct 
counterpoint to the Commission’s Booker report, uses a broader sample that includes these 
cases. 
94.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (seven-year minimum if the firearm is brandished); 
id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (twenty-five-year minimum for a second or subsequent conviction). 
The total minimum sentence exceeds thirty years because the sentences run consecutively. 
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gun” entirely.95 Michelle Alexander, in her recent book about race and 
incarceration, quotes a former U.S. Attorney describing one such incident: 
I had an [assistant U.S. attorney who] wanted to drop the gun charge 
against the defendant [in a case in which] there were no extenuating 
circumstances. I asked, “Why do you want to drop the gun offense?” 
And he said, “He’s a rural guy and grew up on a farm. The gun he had 
with him was a rifle. He’s a good ol’ boy, and all good ol’ boys have 
rifles, and it’s not like he was a gun-toting drug dealer.” But he was a 
gun-toting drug dealer, exactly.96 
Our results suggest that this incident may not have been an anomaly. 
D.  Interpretations and Limitations 
Our research thus suggests that the post-arrest justice process—especially 
mandatory minimum charging—introduces sizable racial disparities. But are 
these gaps really the result of racially disparate treatment? Or do they stem 
from unobserved differences that might be appropriate bases for different 
treatment? As Judge Nancy Gertner has warned, the quest to eliminate 
improper disparities should not lead us to seek “false uniformity” among cases 
that are actually dissimilar despite superficial similarities.97 
No observational study can fully tease out the causes of demographic 
disparities because no dataset can ever capture all the subtle ways in which 
cases can differ.98 So one must tread cautiously when discussing causation—we 
speak in terms of “unexplained disparity,” rather than claiming to have proven 
“discrimination.” Still, our data are rich enough to shed light on some plausible 
 
95.  E.g., Erik Luna, Testimony Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission: Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing Provisions Under Law, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 3 (May 27, 2010), http://www.ussc 
.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/Testimony 
_Luna.pdf. 
96.  ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 116 (alterations in original). 
97.  See United States v. Cabrera, 567 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273 (D. Mass. 2008). 
98.  In other settings involving potential unobserved variables, economists have developed a 
variety of useful quasi-experimental approaches, but these are of little help here. Such 
methods can help to analyze differences in disparities (for instance, before and after policies 
go into effect or among different decision-makers), and we use one such approach below to 
assess Booker’s effects. See infra Part III. But they are not of much use in determining 
whether an apparent racial disparity is “real.” Race is inextricable from the rest of the 
person—there are no clever econometric tricks for isolating the effect of race from the effects 
of unobserved characteristics that might be correlated with race. 
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causal theories, as we will briefly discuss in this Section. In addition, we point 
to some ways in which our disparity estimates may be under-inclusive—they 
do not encompass every discretionary choice shaping the black-white gap. 
Finally, we discuss the way these racial disparities appear to interact with 
gender disparities to produce particularly bad outcomes for black males. 
1.  Possible Unobserved Offense Differences 
A first potential concern with the arrest offense control is unobserved 
differences in the underlying criminal activity. This concern is less severe than 
it might have been: the detailed USMS offense codes, together with the written 
offense description field, capture considerable nuance in offense facts. In 
particular, they seem to effectively capture whether a gun was involved with 
the offense, which is important because of the substantial contribution of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) charges to racial disparities.99 The multi-defendant case 
variable also captures an important offense characteristic, because multi-
defendant cases often involve more serious crimes and often trigger conspiracy 
charges. 
In drug cases, in addition to the limitations to the charge data, the arrest 
codes also contain an important ambiguity: they do not specify drug quantity, 
and other sources of initial alleged quantity are only reliable before 2004.100 But 
estimates on the most recent years with reliable quantity data (2001-03) were 
not substantially affected by the addition of quantity controls.101 There were 
also racial disparities favoring whites in the drug quantities found at sentencing 
fact-finding, after controlling for the seizure quantity and drug type recorded 
 
99.  Use of guns is usually clear from the arrest codes, and our description flags also included 
guns, drugs, and the combination thereof. Some cases might have been missed, but we 
seriously doubt that the number is large enough to explain the large racial disparity in 
924(c) charges. 
100.  The EOUSA suspect investigation files record the drug quantity seized at arrest, but 
patterns in the quantity distribution over time suggest a serious problem with this data field 
beginning in 2004, when EOUSA adopted a new data entry system. Our analysis leads us to 
suspect the problem relates to the addition of a decimal point to the field—perhaps some 
(but not all) prosecutors did not notice the change. Comparisons to the Sentencing 
Commission’s quantity data do, however, make it apparent that the problem is with the new 
system, not the old one. It would be a service to future researchers and the public if EOUSA 
investigated this problem. 
101.  Rehavi & Starr, supra note 9, at 21 n.40. 
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at arrest.102 This suggests that white defendants may be negotiating more 
favorable plea stipulations on quantity. 
Similarly, the arrest data do not record the dollar value of losses in 
economic crimes. In some cases, the arrest codes suggest the scale of the crime 
(for instance, pickpocketing or vehicle theft), but in others (such as wire fraud) 
they do not. It is unlikely, however, that differences in loss quantity could 
explain the racial disparities—in fact, they probably cut in the opposite 
direction. At least as recorded at sentencing fact-finding, white defendants tend 
to be involved in significantly higher-value property crime cases, after 
controlling for the other covariates. 
Another important factor not captured by the arrest data is the defendant’s 
relative role in group offenses. We do not know of any anecdotal reason to 
believe that such differences could explain the racial disparities, that is, that 
white defendants tend to be minor players in conspiracies while black 
defendants tend to be leaders. If this were the basis for the ultimate gaps, one 
would expect to see a noticeable difference in role adjustments at the 
sentencing fact-finding stage. But black defendants get only very slightly worse 
role adjustments on average: a difference of 0.04 offense levels on the forty-
three-level Guidelines scale, after controlling for the observed variables.103 This 
difference is statistically significant, but it is very small, and suggests that role 
differences are unlikely to explain much of the black-white sentencing gap. 
2.  Possible Differences in Offender Characteristics 
Beyond the offense characteristics, there might be relevant offender 
characteristics that contribute to the race gap. We control for criminal history, 
the main offender characteristic built into sentencing law.104 The most obvious 
other possibility is socioeconomic differences, which are highly correlated with 
race. While poverty would not be a “warranted” reason for worse case 
outcomes, it would be a non-racial one and might suggest different policy 
approaches. However, the unexplained disparities we identify exist even after 
controlling for a variety of socioeconomic indicators such as education, county-
 
102.  Quantities were converted into implied offense levels according to the Guidelines tables to 
allow comparisons across drug types. 
103.  The range of possible role adjustments is from -4 to +4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 3B1.1 to 3B1.2 (2012). 
104.  Criminal history was not included in our main charging analysis because it is only recorded 
for the subset of charged defendants who were eventually sentenced. But within that subset, 
the charging disparities persisted after controlling for criminal history. 
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level variables, and defense counsel type (an excellent proxy for poverty 
because public defenders or other publicly funded counsel are appointed only if 
the defendant is poor). Perhaps more remarkably, our socioeconomic factors 
taken together do not contribute significantly to the “explained” share of the 
racial disparity.105 This appears to be because poverty itself (as reflected by 
these indicia) is not an important predictor of higher sentences.106 Notably, 
representation by a public defender is associated with slightly lower sentences, 
all else equal. 
This absence of socioeconomic disparity is good news, and it cuts against 
conventional wisdom.107 Can it really be that poor defendants do not fare 
worse? It is possible that the conventional wisdom might not apply to the 
federal courts, where indigent defendants generally receive high-quality 
representation, especially from federal public defenders.108 We suspect that we 
would not have gotten the same result had we studied states in which indigent 
representation is under-resourced and in disarray.109 We note that this point 
may have policy implications: the federal example offers a potential model for 
those states. When a justice system devotes sufficient resources to indigent 
defense to attract strong lawyers, train them well, and keep caseloads 
reasonable, poverty need not drive outcomes, and the race gap will likely be 
smaller than it might otherwise be.110 
 
105.  The decomposition estimators we used allowed us to estimate the combined explanatory 
value of a group of variables in explaining the black-white gap, and the socioeconomic status 
indicators did not explain a significant share of that gap. 
106.  Some of these variables have significant effects on some outcome variables, but these effects 
are small and inconsistent in sign. There is no overall pattern suggesting that poverty 
worsens outcomes. 
107.  The hurdles facing indigent defendants have long been the subject of extensive scholarship 
and policy attention. See, e.g., The Access to Justice Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/atj/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (noting the “access-to-justice crisis”). 
108.  Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 341-42 (2011) (“Federal appellate and district judges in our sample 
express high regard for prosecutors and public defenders but low regard for court-appointed 
counsel and retained counsel . . . .”). 
109.  See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686-87 (2007) (describing “rampant 
structural ineffectiveness” resulting from defenders being “incredibly overworked and 
severely underfunded”). 
110.  See Steven B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 
75 MO. L. REV. 683, 685 & n.11 (2010) (noting the superior resources of federal public 
defenders). 
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3.  Possible Sources of Disparity that Our Estimates Leave Out 
Although it is possible that our estimates of “unexplained” racial disparities 
include components that in fact have legitimate but unobserved explanations, 
in another sense these estimates are arguably under-inclusive. Our process-
wide approach estimates disparities across a much broader swath of the 
criminal justice process than existing studies do, but even our method does not 
encompass all of the key decision points. In addition to prosecutors and judges, 
other decision-makers shape criminal case outcomes—most notably, law 
enforcement agents and policymakers. 
Any disparities produced by those actors’ choices will be found in the 
“explained” portions of the race gap—that is, the portions attributed to the 
control variables. It is important not to overlook those portions when thinking 
about what should be done about racial disparity, however. Rather than simply 
using regression methods to filter them out, as most studies do, we therefore 
used decomposition methods that allow us to estimate the relative contribution 
of each control variable to the total observed black-white gap. These methods 
showed that the variables with by far the most explanatory value are arrest 
offense and criminal history. These variables may capture important 
differences that we want sentencing law to reflect, but they also reflect 
discretionary choices. 
First, the recorded arrest offenses will be affected by law enforcement 
choices.111 This is a key limitation of our strategy of controlling for the arrest 
offense. We stated earlier that policymakers should ideally ask whether those 
who committed the same crime end up with the same sentence, but this is a very 
hard question to answer empirically. Researchers cannot observe what the 
defendants actually did. The arrest offense is a much better proxy for actual 
conduct than the presumptive Guidelines sentence, but it is not a perfect one. If 
it diverges from actual conduct in a racially disparate way, our “unexplained” 
disparity estimates will not capture that divergence. Nor do our estimates 
capture sample selection introduced by police decisions that determine who 
lands in the federal criminal justice system at all.112 
 
111.  If the prosecutor’s pre-arrest involvement in the case influenced the arrest offense, this 
omission may leave out an aspect of prosecutorial discretion as well. When we drop cases 
with pre-arrest indictments (the cases with the most extensive pre-arrest involvement), 
disparity estimates increase. 
112.  Black arrestees comprise 45% of our sample, a rate far exceeding the overall share of black 
people in the general population; the question is the extent to which this overrepresentation 
reflects actual crime rates or policing patterns. This gap is included neither in the 
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In theory, these limitations could bias our results in either direction, but we 
think they probably mean we are understating the total disparities in the justice 
system. For arrest-stage disparities to explain our results instead, even 
partially, one would have to believe that federal law enforcement favors black 
suspects. We think this is unlikely. Many criminal justice scholars have argued 
that black males are disproportionately targeted by law enforcement, while 
virtually nobody claims the opposite.113 Black people are arrested for drug 
crimes at a much higher rate than white people are, even though they self-
report both drug use and drug dealing at equivalent or lower rates.114 Beyond 
comparing arrest rates to reported crime rates, policing disparities are hard to 
study empirically because the underlying criminal behavior usually cannot be 
observed by researchers. But the existing quantitative evidence either supports 
the conventional wisdom or at least does not cut in the opposite direction.115 To 
be sure, federal law enforcement could be different, but we are likewise 
unaware of any anecdotal suggestions that federal agents favor black suspects. 
In addition, both the arrest offense and the criminal history components of 
the “explained” disparity reflect subjective policy choices: important sources of 
disparity may simply be built into the law.116 In the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Congress responded to such a concern by partially mitigating the sentencing 
 
“explained” part nor the “unexplained” part of our disparity estimates; we can only 
decompose disparities within the set of cases we have data on. 
113.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4. In addition, surveys consistently find white Americans 
believe the police are fair while black Americans do not. See Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, 
Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 
67 J. POL. 762 (2005). These perceptions may reflect real differences in experience. 
114.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 97-98 (reviewing these studies); see also William J. Stuntz, 
Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998) (observing that drug enforcement 
targets open-air markets, which are dominated by black men). 
115.  See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-
and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 813 (2007) 
(finding evidence that black people in New York City are stopped and frisked at 
disproportionately high rates, and reviewing the policing-disparity literature). Much of the 
existing research focuses on traffic stops and reaches mixed results. Black drivers and male 
drivers are more likely to be stopped and searched, but some researchers have found a lack 
of disparity in the “hit rate” of stops and searches (for example, the rate of finding drugs), 
which they argue makes the policing pattern “rational.” See, e.g., Nicola Persico & Petra 
Todd, Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to 
Vehicle Searches in Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351, F364 (2006). Others find lower hit rates for 
black and Hispanic suspects than for white suspects, which suggests discrimination. See, 
e.g., Sarath Sanga, Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 
117 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1157 (2009). This literature does not, in any event, suggest irrational 
favoritism towards black people. 
116.  See Alschuler, supra note 28, at 87-88. 
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framework’s notoriously harsh treatment of crack cocaine cases.117 But the crack 
laws are not the only example of particularly heavy punishments being given to 
crimes disproportionately involving black defendants. The harsh gun 
enhancements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are another example—because black 
men are more frequently arrested with guns, as shown by our data, these 
enhancements would disparately impact black men even if they were neutrally 
applied. Similarly, our data show that black males are also more frequently 
arrested for violent crimes, and sentencing law is often harsher on these crimes 
than on nonviolent crimes that might reasonably be considered more serious.118 
These sentencing-law features are built into the arrest offense component of 
the measured disparities. 
The criminal history component likewise reflects a subjective policy 
judgment to assign heavy weight to past crimes, even though those crimes have 
already been separately punished. While there are many competing 
considerations surrounding that judgment, it has a racially disparate impact. 
Moreover, this choice magnifies whatever racially disparate treatment exists in 
the criminal justice system by carrying its impact from one case to the next: the 
criminal history score may be influenced by disparate treatment in past cases. 
That past disparity will appear as part of the “explained” disparity, so it is easy 
to lose sight of it—it will be filtered away by controlling for criminal history.119 
Underlying unwarranted disparity can thus come to appear legally warranted. 
4.  Race, Gender, and Their Interaction 
Finally, another limitation is that we only include men. Starr’s related study 
examines gender disparities and race-gender interactions.120 She finds 
unexplained gender disparities that dwarf the racial disparities our joint study 
found: men receive sentences that are over 60% longer than women’s, even 
 
117.  Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 28 
U.S.C.). 
118.  For instance, suppose X, who is unarmed, obtains $20 from Y by threatening to hit Y, and 
runs off with it. With no aggravating factors, his Guidelines offense level for robbery would 
be 20, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (2012)—the same offense level that 
would have applied had he defrauded Y out of nearly $1 million, id. at § 2B1.1. 
119.  Through its career offender and armed career criminal provisions, federal sentencing law is 
particularly harsh on cases that combine violent or (especially) gun cases with extensive 
criminal history—another structural feature with particularly harsh effects on black men. See 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.4 
(2012). 
120.  Starr, supra note 79, at 1, 16. 
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after controlling for the arrest offense, criminal history, and other pre-charge 
observable characteristics.121 These gaps are much larger than most other 
studies have estimated because—as with race—they appear to mostly arise 
prior to the final sentencing decision.122 The data suggest that differences in 
offender characteristics not captured by the main control variables may explain 
substantial shares of this gap, particularly differences in childcare 
responsibilities and perceived role in group offenses.123 But Starr finds large 
unexplained disparities (over 50%) even among non-parents and in one-
defendant cases, so these explanations do not appear to come close to 
explaining the whole gender gap, nor do any of the other theories Starr is able 
to test.124 
Notably, the gender gap was substantially larger (about 75%) among black 
defendants.125 The racial disparities we found for men do not recur among 
women; there is no significant unexplained black-white gap in sentences for 
female defendants. The black female/white female gap appears to be explained 
entirely by differences in arrest offense and criminal history—although, again, 
it is possible that these factors build in structural, arrest-stage, or other hidden 
sources of disparity. 
As noted above, black males are incarcerated at extremely high rates in the 
United States, and, in assessing this problem, policymakers should consider 
both the race and gender dimensions and their interactions. Black male 
defendants appear to face not only the harsher side of both the racial and 
gender disparities, but also an additional interaction effect—an extra apparent 
penalty for being both black and male. Gender disparity need not be seen as 
being about special treatment of women—rather, one could ask why the 
criminal justice system appears to treat males so much more harshly. If it did 
not, Starr’s data suggest that many fewer black men would be in prison. 
 
121.  Id. at 17. 
122.  In the gender context, an especially large share of the disparity appears to arise in sentencing 
fact-finding. Id. at 2. Mandatory minimums are also important, but only in drug cases, id. at 
11, presumably because women are rarely arrested for the kinds of non-drug crimes to which 
mandatory minimums apply. Indeed, Starr’s analysis excluded gun offenses as well as sex 
and child pornography offenses entirely because there were so few female defendants in 
those categories. Id. app., at ii. 
123.  Id. at 12-17. 
124.  Id. at 14. 
125.  Id. at 16. 
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i i i .  the booker question: does expanding judicial 
discretion increase racial disparity? 
The discussion above illustrates the serious limitations of an empirical 
approach that focuses on the sentencing decision in isolation. In this Part, we 
apply that insight to the question that so worried Justice Stevens in his Booker 
dissent: has freeing judges to sentence outside the Guidelines led to an increase 
in unwarranted disparities? The Sentencing Commission has given the most 
prominent answer to this question so far, and its answer is a resounding yes. 
Its race findings have garnered understandable attention, because they are 
shocking: Booker and its progeny appear to have led to a nearly fourfold 
increase in racial disparity in sentencing, from 5.5% to 19.5%.126 This was an 
explosive finding, and it has led to calls (spearheaded by the Commission 
itself) to reinstate stronger constraints on judicial discretion.127 However, we 
show here that the Commission’s conclusions are unfounded. Properly 
analyzed, there is no evidence that unexplained racial disparity in sentences has 
increased since Booker—much less because of Booker. 
There are two core problems with the Commission’s analysis of Booker—
problems that also pervade the rest of the empirical literature examining the 
disparity consequences of sentencing law reforms. The first is that the studies 
estimate disparity in a very limited way—the problem discussed in Part II. In 
Section III.A, we explain why the “presumptive sentence” approach is a 
particularly poor choice for analyzing Booker’s effects, and we present a simple 
linear trend analysis showing that when disparity is estimated using our 
broader method, it has not increased in the years since Booker (and may have 
declined). In Section III.B, we discuss an additional serious problem with the 
existing studies: poor causal inference strategies. Even if it were true that 
disparity had increased after Booker, that is, these studies provide no reason to 
believe Booker was the cause. In Section III.C, we introduce a method that can 
be used to assess causation—a regression discontinuity-style approach. In 
 
126.  See 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 108. 
127.  The Commission laid out a detailed plan for restoring force to the Guidelines in its most 
recent report, 2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 111-15, and has held 
hearings on the subject. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The former Chair of the 
Sentencing Commission, Judge William K. Sessions, has cited the Commission’s disparity 
report in warning that post-Booker disparities are likely to lead Congress to adopt more 
mandatory minimums; Sessions himself proposes a simplified mandatory guidelines system 
instead. William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power 
Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 309-10, 337-56 (2011). 
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Section III.D, we present the results of this analysis of Booker’s effects on 
sentencing as well as charging and plea-bargaining. Finally, in Section III.E, 
we discuss the limitations on our analysis and explain why researchers may 
never be able to give an entirely definitive answer to the question of Booker’s 
effects.128 
A.  The Changing Yardstick Problem 
A subset of the sentencing disparity literature focuses on measuring changes 
in disparity resulting from changes to sentencing law, such as Booker. Like 
other sentencing disparity analyses, these studies typically control for the 
presumptive Guidelines sentence as well as the statutory mandatory minimum. 
The problem with this approach is largely explained above, but it impacts 
sentencing-reform studies in a slightly different way. In principle, studies 
focusing on changes in disparities have an advantage over those that estimate 
the extent of “unwarranted” disparity: the ability to ignore the possibility of 
stable differences between groups that the observed variables do not capture.129 
Suppose the control variables amount to only a “broken yardstick” for 
measuring the defendant’s underlying criminal behavior—for instance, 
suppose the presumptive sentence variable diverges from true case severity in 
racially disparate ways. In a policy-change study, so long as the same broken 
yardstick is used before and after the policy change, one can validly estimate 
the policy’s relative effects on different groups. This advantage is a mixed 
blessing: estimates of changes in disparity are less policy-relevant if we do not 
know whether the disparity in either the pre- or the post-period is “real.” Still, 
not every study needs to answer every question, and research that brackets the 
“is this real?” question can be useful. 
However, a serious problem arises if one cannot be confident that the 
yardstick itself has not been affected by the policy change. Consider again the 
2012 Sentencing Commission report discussed above. It found that the black-
white gap rose from 5.5% before Booker to 15.2% after, and finally to 19.5% after 
Booker’s successor cases Kimbrough and Gall.130 Other studies have likewise 
found at least some increase in disparity after Booker or after Kimbrough and 
 
128.  The Booker results are presented only in this Article, rather than being further developed 
elsewhere, so we provide more technical detail in this Part, as well as tables and figures. 
129.  See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 54, at 738-39. 
130.  2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 108. 
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Gall (although not as large).131 Below, we discuss potential confounding factors 
that make it very problematic to infer that these changes were caused by either 
Booker or Kimbrough/Gall. But let’s start with a more basic question: do these 
numbers actually tell us that racial disparity in sentences has grown? 
In each period, the Sentencing Commission estimates sentencing 
disparities conditional on the presumptive sentence (likely a “broken yardstick” 
for the reasons discussed above), and then compares the disparities across time 
periods. If one were certain that racial disparities in the processes determining 
the presumptive sentence remained constant pre- and post-Booker, then this 
would be a “same broken yardstick” comparison. Whatever biases were hidden 
in the presumptive sentence variable would affect the estimates for both time 
periods similarly, so the comparison would be apples-to-apples. 
But the problem is that Booker may have replaced one broken yardstick 
with a different one by affecting charging, plea-bargaining, or sentencing fact-
finding in racially disparate ways. In other words, cases with the same 
presumptive sentences may represent different actual conduct pre- and post-
Booker in ways that vary by race. Sample selection bias is also a potential 
problem: Booker may have changed which cases are winnowed out by the 
“funnel” of the criminal process, such that the samples of sentenced cases 
before and after Booker are not fairly comparable. 
There is good reason to worry about these potential biases. One clear lesson 
from the legal scholarship reviewed in Part I is that the stages in the criminal 
justice process are interrelated. Charging, plea-bargaining, and fact-finding all 
occur in anticipation of and in an attempt to influence the sentencing 
consequences. It is not even remotely safe to assume that changes in sentencing 
law do not affect decision-making at those earlier stages. After all, consider 
what happened after the Guidelines were adopted: a drastic increase in guilty 
pleas, which legal scholars have (very plausibly) attributed to prosecutors’ 
sharp increase in leverage.132 
There are many theoretically plausible ways decision-making prior to 
sentencing could have changed after Booker. For example: 
   Prosecutors might have to offer more favorable plea deals to induce 
guilty pleas, potentially resulting in more favorable findings of fact, 
 
131.  See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 54; Nowacki, supra note 46; Ulmer et al., supra 
note 45. 
132.  See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text. 
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reduced charges and presumptive sentences, and perhaps more 
trials.133 
   Prosecutors could respond to the reduction in their power to 
manipulate the Guidelines to control the sentence by expanding 
use of their other tool for constraining judges: statutory mandatory 
minimums. 
   Judges might become less willing to make findings of fact that 
diverge from the plea stipulations, because doing so is no longer 
necessary to achieve what they perceive as a just sentencing result—
they can depart instead. 
These changes would only bias estimates of post-Booker changes to racial 
disparity if they had a racially disparate impact on the presumptive sentence or 
on the composition of the sentenced sample.134 It is possible that this is not so, 
of course, but one cannot simply assume it is not so—it must be tested. 
However, all of the existing studies of Booker (and prior studies of the initial 
shift to mandatory sentencing) do assume exactly that, usually implicitly. 
Other studies have criticized various other aspects of the Sentencing 
Commission’s Booker study and have reached different conclusions. But these 
studies too have taken the sentencing-stage-only approach, controlling either 
for the presumptive sentence or for something closely related (the Guidelines 
“base offense level”), and thus are subject to the same concern.135 
These studies, in short, ignore the “hydraulic discretion” theory that has 
dominated theoretical scholarship about sentencing reform.136 Conversely, key 
aspects of the hydraulic discretion theory remain almost completely untested 
 
133.  If cases thereby became more resource-intensive, one might expect prosecutors to bring 
fewer cases or fewer charges per case. See J.J. Prescott, Empirical Evidence of Prosecutorial 
Charging Manipulation (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
134.  This could be the case even if the changes looked superficially equivalent by race. For 
instance, if prosecutors doubled their use of mandatory minimums for both black and white 
defendants in response to Booker, but their underlying use of mandatory minimums was 
twice as common for black defendants, the doubling would look racially neutral even as it 
had twice the impact on black defendants’ sentences. 
135.  E.g., Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 54, at 730-31 (finding mixed results in an 
analysis of multiple doctrinal changes affecting judicial discretion, but concluding that 
expanded discretion does not increase and may mitigate racial disparity); Nowacki, supra 
note 46, at 16-17 (finding a post-Booker increase in mean black-white disparity); Ulmer et 
al., supra note 45, at 1108 (finding a post-Booker increase in racial disparity in incarceration 
rates but not in sentence length). 
136.  See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
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empirically.137 No empirical studies have yet used case data to assess changes in 
disparities in charging, plea-bargaining, or sentencing fact-finding in the wake 
of Booker. One study surveyed federal district court judges and defense 
attorneys about their perceptions of whether aspects of plea-bargaining had 
changed.138 However, the researchers did not evaluate these perceptions’ 
accuracy, and the perceptions of judges and defense counsel varied quite 
substantially.139 
Just a few studies have looked at changes in charging and plea-bargaining 
disparities in response to earlier changes to sentencing law and policy. 
Wooldredge et al. found that Ohio’s shift to mandatory sentencing reduced 
racial disparities in charge-bargaining, yet increased racial disparities in 
sentencing (a surprising result).140 But the authors did not evaluate changes in 
initial charging, without which the results are harder to interpret. In a 1987 
study of Minnesota’s adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines, Miethe did 
evaluate initial charging and found a small but significant increase in gender 
disparity and no significant change in racial disparity; plea-bargaining 
disparities were unchanged.141 No studies have evaluated changes in disparities 
in sentencing fact-finding. 
Beyond the failure to account for pre-sentencing stages of the process, 
recall that the Sentencing Commission’s study of Booker has an additional 
problem: it also controls for departure status, thereby also filtering out some of 
the potential disparities in the sentencing decision as well. This is an especially 
surprising choice for a study of Booker’s effects, because, as we will see below, 
Booker dramatically changed the probability of a departure from the Guidelines 
by authorizing departures that were previously forbidden. It is odd to compare 
racial disparities in sentencing before and after Booker only after filtering out 
those mediated by racial differences in departure rates. 
In Table 1, we show that the “changing yardstick” problem is neither 
 
137.  Engen, supra note 31, at 324-25. 
138.  Jeffery T. Ulmer & Michael T. Light, The Stability of Case Processing and Sentencing Post-
Booker, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 143 (2010) (finding perceptions of increased detail in 
factual stipulations and appeal waivers in plea agreements, but also increased entry of “open 
pleas” with no agreement). 
139.  Id. 
140.  John Wooldredge et al., (Un)anticipated Effects of Sentencing Reform on the Disparate 
Treatment of Defendants, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 835, 860-64 (2005). 
141.  Miethe, supra note 10, at 167-71. The Miethe and Wooldredge et al. studies are rare 
examples of studies that focus on “hydraulic” effects of sentencing reform; however, both 
are subject to the other critique raised below concerning causal inference from changes over 
time. 
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merely theoretical nor subtle: the use of these problematic control variables can 
completely change the apparent trends in racial disparity. We used a simple 
linear time-trend model to estimate the overall difference in sentences imposed 
on black and white defendants, as well as the average growth in that gap over 
time.142 We included cases sentenced between the PROTECT Act and the end 
of fiscal year 2009, and focused on black and non-Hispanic white men.143 
Thus, this analysis covers the time period and groups for which the Sentencing 
Commission found the purported quadrupling of disparity.144 The sample 
includes all non-immigration cases except those subject to major substantive 
sentencing-law changes during the study period: identity theft, obscenity/child 
sexual exploitation, and sex offender registration. For reasons explained above, 
we omit immigration cases.145 
The purpose of Table 1 is to show the contrast in racial disparity estimates 
and time trends when one uses our preferred method of measuring disparity 
(described in Part II) as compared to variations on the “presumptive sentence” 
method. In Column 1, we show the estimated linear trend in average sentence 
when controlling for the arrest offense and other prior characteristics (our 
preferred method).146 That is, Column 1 shows the trend over time in the 
aggregate black-white sentence disparity introduced during the post-arrest 
justice process. The estimated trend in racial disparity is insignificant, and its 
sign is actually negative: the model (noisily) estimates that the unexplained 
 
 
142.  Specifically, the regression includes an overall linear (monthly) time trend as well as an 
interaction between that trend and the “black” coefficient. 
143.  The PROTECT Act went into effect on April 30, 2003, and included various provisions 
designed to discourage downward departures from the Guidelines. PROTECT Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. 
and 28 U.S.C.); see infra note 156 and accompanying text. The Sentencing Commission uses 
it to demarcate the beginning of the immediate pre-Booker period (the period in which the 
Guidelines were at their most restrictive, and in which they find the lowest disparity), so we 
also use it as the starting point for this time trend analysis. See 2010 U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
144.  We use the time period covered in the main Sentencing Commission report on demographic 
disparities (from 2010). The Commission’s recent update adds 2010 and 2011, but those 
years of data have not been made available to researchers. In any event, the Commission’s 
original estimates (through 2009) were even more dramatic than those in its later report: it 
found that during the period from Kimbrough/Gall to the end of fiscal year 2009, the 
disparity was 23.3%, more than four times its post-PROTECT, pre-Booker level. See 2010 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23. 
145.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
146.  We controlled for arrest offense, criminal history, district, education, age, and multi-
defendant case structure. 
 




average monthly changes in sentence length and final offense level 
 
may 2003 - september 2009: comparison of linear trend models 
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12.66** 3.16** 0.91 1.17** 
(1.15) (0.77) (0.76) (0.11) 
     
Month 
(Overall Linear Time 
Trend) 
-0.000 -0.089** -0.106** 0.014** 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001) 
     
Black*Month 
(Trend in Black-White 
Disparity) 
-0.027 0.043** 0.044** -0.012** 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) 
     
Arrest Offense Controls? Yes No No Yes 
Final Offense Level/ 
Category and Mandatory 
Minimum Controls? 
No Yes Yes No 
Departure Status 
Control? No No Yes No 
Observations 119,977 119,784 119,784 119,908 
Total Change in Black-
White Disparity Implied 
by Estimates in Months 
-2.1 +3.3 +3.3 -0.9 
Coefficients for sentencing month, black, and black*month from OLS regressions. 
Regressions also include controls for criminal history, district, age, citizenship, education, and 
multi-defendant case status, in addition to those controls noted in the table. The implied 
overall change is calculated by multiplying the monthly disparity trend by seventy-six months 
(the length of the period). Standard errors clustered on race-month in parentheses. † p<0.1, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
  
the yale law journal 123:2   2013  
46 
 
black-white sentence gap declined by 2.1 months, from about 12.7 months to 
about 10.6 months, over the course of the period.147 
The negative sign of this estimated change is consistent across a variety of 
estimation strategies and sample definitions. For instance, while Table 1 shows 
the results when sentence length is estimated in months (including non-
incarceration sentences as zeros), we get similar results if we use a log-linear 
model excluding the zeros. We also get essentially identical results when we 
estimate yearly rather than monthly trends. Likewise, we see no rise in 
disparity over time when, instead of estimating linear trends, we estimate the 
differences in the “black” effect among the three key time periods that the 
Sentencing Commission study identifies (PROTECT-to-Booker, Booker-to-
Gall, and post-Gall).148 And indeed, some reasonable variations on our 
approach produce significant and much larger estimated downward trends. For 
instance, the Table 1 results exclude offense categories that were affected by 
major substantive changes in the law, because we wanted to focus on disparity 
trends in the administration of the law. But had we included these offense 
categories (as the Sentencing Commission did), the estimated decline in 
disparity during the study period would have been significant and nearly three 
times as large—about six months total.149 
Why, then, does the Sentencing Commission find an increase in disparity 
during this period? There may be a variety of explanations,150 but a prime 
reason appears to be that racial disparity in the processes determining the 
presumptive sentence declined significantly over the same period. By 
controlling for the presumptive sentence, the Commission filtered out that 
 
147.  This figure is obtained by multiplying the per-month linear trend estimate by the number of 
months. 
148.  We obtain this estimate with a single differences-in-differences regression containing time 
period dummies interacted with the “black” variable. This analysis shows, if anything, 
slightly smaller disparities in the later periods (with the smallest post-Gall), although the 
period-race interaction terms are not significant. Standard errors are clustered on the month 
to account for possible events affecting many cases at once. All significant results remain so 
with alternative clustering, such as clustering on the district to account for correlated 
prosecutorial policies or courthouse practices. 
149.  This is likely because, as our data show, child pornography and child sexual exploitation 
arrestees are overwhelmingly white, so increasing sentences for those offenses tends to 
reduce black-white disparity. Also, had we included Hispanic defendants, the estimated 
decline in disparity would have been larger and statistically significant. 
150.  Among other things, these may include the Commission’s arbitrary choice of the 0.01-
month valuation of non-prison sentences, the lack of detailed offense-type controls, and the 
inclusion of immigration cases. These issues are discussed supra notes 67 and 78 and 
accompanying text and infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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reduction in disparity, leaving only a misleading picture. The black-white gap 
in sentences relative to the presumptive sentence may have grown, but that is 
because the black-white gap in presumptive sentences shrank (after controlling 
for underlying case characteristics). In other words, when one controls for the 
presumptive sentence, the disparities look larger in the later period because the 
presumptive sentence control is filtering out less of the disparity. The 
presumptive sentence was not the “same broken yardstick” during this period. 
Over time, the yardstick changed. 
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 1 illustrate this point. In the regression 
shown in Column 2, rather than controlling for the arrest offense, we 
substituted the final offense level, the mandatory minimum indicator, and 
broad offense-type categories associated with the offense of conviction. This 
reflects a fairly typical version of the presumptive sentence approach. Recall 
that the presumptive sentence is determined by the final offense level (and the 
criminal history category, which we control for in all regressions). The 
regression in Column 3 is identical except that we more closely approximate 
the Commission’s approach by also adding departure status controls.151 After 
these modifications, both of these regressions show a significant linear increase 
in racial disparity over time, albeit not as dramatic an increase as the 
Commission itself found. In the Column 2 version, the unexplained black-
white gap increases from about 3.2 months at the beginning of the period to 
about 6.5 months at the end. When departure status is added as a control in 
Column 3, the black-white gap is estimated to rise from about 0.9 months at 
the beginning of the period to about 4.2 months at the end.152 
Thus, when we use variations on the presumptive sentence approach, we 
do see significant increases in disparity, just as other studies have found. But 
that approach is inappropriate and misleading, because of the “changing 
yardstick” problem. Column 4 focuses directly on that changing yardstick. In 
Column 4, we show a time-trend regression with the final offense level as the 
outcome of interest. After controlling for the arrest offense and other pre-
charge characteristics, the unexplained black-white disparity in final offense 
levels declined by nearly one level during this period. For the average case in 
 
151.  As explained above, we believe that it is a mistake to control for departure status, even if one 
intends to focus on judicial behavior alone. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. We do 
so here purely for illustrative purposes. 
152.  Note that even in the Column 2 and Column 3 regressions, the overall estimated average 
sentences for black defendants are lower at the end of the period than at the beginning. That 
is, even with the presumptive sentence approach, the rise in black-white disparity is not 
large enough to offset the overall monthly trend—other factors equal, sentences for both 
black and white defendants declined in all of the models over time. 
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the sample, a change of one offense level is associated with a five-month 
change in presumptive sentence length—close to the difference between the 
disparity trend estimate in Column 1 (-2.1 months) and those in Columns 2 
and 3 (+3.3 months).153 That is, the changing nature of the presumptive-
sentence yardstick appears to explain nearly all the difference between the 
disparity decline that we measure using our method (Column 1) and the 
apparent increase that one sees when one uses a method paralleling those of 
other studies. 
Thus, the overall unexplained racial disparity in the post-arrest justice 
process certainly does not appear to have increased from 2003 to 2009, and if 
anything, it seems to have decreased. The linear trend results do suggest that 
the procedural sources of disparity may have shifted over the course of the 
period, with the earlier stages in the process becoming a bit less important and 
the judicial sentencing decision becoming a bit more important. However, it 
bears noting that throughout the time period, the earlier process stages appear 
to be the dominant procedural sources of disparity. That is, the overall 
estimated racial disparities are much larger when one controls for the arrest 
offense—thereby incorporating disparities from those earlier procedural 
stages—than when one uses either version of the presumptive sentence model 
(compare the “black” coefficient in Column 1 to the “black” coefficients in 
Columns 2 and 3). This is consistent with our research on the sources of post-
Booker disparities,154 which finds that even in the most recent years, charging 
decisions appear to be the major driver of sentencing disparity. 
Note that we make no claims as to the causes of these longer-term trends, 
and specifically, we do not claim to have established that Booker caused them. 
As we explain in the next Section, causal inference from changes over lengthy 
periods of time is a fraught enterprise. Table 1 merely shows that, even setting 
aside the causal inference concern, racial disparity in the post-arrest justice 
process is no worse today than it was before Booker was decided. 
 
153.  When we repeat the Column 3 analysis (the one closest to the Commission’s) on a sample 
that includes the excluded obscenity, sex-offender, child sex crimes, and identity theft 
categories, we obtain a somewhat stronger estimated upward trend in disparity, totaling 
about four months. Likewise, when we repeat the Column 4 analysis for that sample, we 
find a larger decrease in offense-level disparity, totaling 1.5 levels. This supports the theory 
that inclusion of those categories contributed to the Commission’s findings of increased 
disparity in the later periods, largely because the underlying presumptive sentence measure 
was changing. 
154.  See supra Part II. 
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B.  The Causal Inference Problem 
In addition to the use of inappropriate control variables, there is another 
major methodological problem with previous studies of Booker’s effects: they 
lack a basis for sound causal inference. Causal inferences from changes over 
time are always risky, because many things change over time. Comparisons of 
averages between periods before and after a policy change, while appealingly 
simple, can be misleading. 
These studies generally compare the average disparity before and after a 
policy change. In most, disparities are estimated separately for each period 
using a regression model that controls for the presumptive sentence and other 
observed variables.155 The recent federal studies have focused not just on 
Booker, but also on other recent policy changes affecting judges’ sentencing 
discretion. One such change was Title IV of the PROTECT Act of 2003, which 
imposed rules intended to discourage downward departures from the 
Guidelines. It required courts to report to Congress on departure rates, 
required written justifications for departures, provided for de novo appellate 
review of departures in some cases, restricted the Sentencing Commission from 
creating new grounds for downward departures, limited judicially initiated 
downward adjustments for “acceptance of responsibility,” and directed DOJ to 
adopt an action plan for reducing departures.156 The Supreme Court’s 
December 2007 decisions in Kimbrough and Gall (discussed above), which 
reinforced the Booker holding, have also been a focus of the recent research.157 
The Sentencing Commission focused on three primary time periods, with 
cases classified by sentencing date: (1) PROTECT-to-Booker (nearly two 
years), (2) Booker-to-Kimbrough/Gall (nearly three years), and (3) post-
Kimbrough/Gall (nearly two years). It found the lowest black-white disparities 
in period (1), when judicial discretion was the most limited, and the greatest in 
period (3), when discretion was broadest.158 A competing study by Jeffrey 
Ulmer, Michael Light, and John Kramer criticized aspects of the Commission’s 
method, but it too compared averages across these time periods (as well as 
 
155.  The use of separate regressions means that these studies do not control for the case mix 
across time periods, which is another problem. Some studies report single regressions with 
race-time period interactions, which is preferable (but does not solve the other problems 
raised here). See Ulmer et al., supra note 45, at 1096 (reporting both methods). 
156.  PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
157.  See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
158.  2012 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. A, at 2-3. 
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earlier periods).159 It similarly found increases in racial disparity in the post-
Booker and post-Kimbrough/Gall periods, although these effects were 
concentrated in the decision whether to incarcerate defendants rather than in 
sentence length among those incarcerated.160 A recent study by Jeffrey 
Nowacki similarly compares the cases from 2002-2004 (pre-Booker) to those 
from 2005-2008 (post-Booker), and finds a fairly small but significant increase 
in disparity in the latter period, controlling for final Guidelines offense level, 
criminal history, and other variables.161 
But comparison of averages across such broad periods is at best suggestive 
and is too blunt a tool for causal inference. Differences in the averages between 
periods might merely reflect longer-term trends or other intervening events. If 
racial disparity were rising steadily throughout the period, for instance, the 
average disparity after Booker would necessarily be larger even if Booker had no 
effect on racial disparity. In fact, this would be true even if Booker actually 
slowed the rate of increase in disparity. 
Sentencing disparity might well be affected by numerous non-Booker-
related developments over periods of this length. One possibility is changes in 
the underlying case mix—including case types, severity, and defendant  
 
 
159.  Ulmer et al., supra note 45, at 1091-94, also includes the pre-PROTECT period. 
160.  Id. Much of the authors’ criticism focused on the Commission’s failure to separate the 
incarceration decision from the length decision. See id. at 1093-94. In our view there is no 
theoretical reason the two decisions necessarily need to be separated; either approach is 
acceptable. The main problem with the Commission’s approach is that even though it kept 
the zeroes in the main sample, it log-transformed the outcome variable; since the log of zero 
is undefined, the Commission assigned the value of 0.01 months to the non-incarceration 
sentences. The problem is that the choice of 0.01 is arbitrary, and the resulting effect 
estimates are sensitive to this arbitrary choice. 
          Separating the incarceration and length decisions, as Ulmer et al. did, avoids this 
problem, but raises another concern: if there is disparity in the incarceration decision, it will 
introduce sample selection bias to the length analysis. See Ulmer et al., supra note 45, at 
1091-94. Starr examines this problem and various alternative solutions in detail. Starr, supra 
note 79, at 5-7. In the analysis reported in Part II, we did separate the two stages, but it was 
not problematic because we found no significant disparity in the incarceration decision after 
controlling for arrest offense. If one does find disparity there, as Ulmer et al. did, the sample 
selection concern is more serious, and it is better to leave the zeroes in the main sample and 
either not log-transform the outcome or use alternative statistical methods. If the zeroes are 
included, linear regression (estimated with robust standard errors) can still be used to 
estimate average disparities; it is an unbiased estimator of the conditional mean even if its 
distributional assumptions are violated. Note that there is no “censored data” concern here; 
non-incarceration sentences are known zeroes, not unknown outcomes. 
161.  Nowacki, supra note 46, at 15-16. 
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characteristics—as underlying crime patterns and federal law enforcement 
priorities change. Controlling for case characteristics within each time period, 
as the Commission and similar studies do, only filters out the effects of 
differences in the distributions of characteristics for black versus white 
defendants during that period. It does not mean that changes in the case mix 
between time periods will not affect the disparity estimates. The type of model 
used by the Commission and in similar studies gives a single estimate for the 
effect of being black, averaged across all (male) cases, but in practice this 
average surely hides heterogeneity. That is, the gap between white males and 
black males might in practice vary depending on the nature of the case or the 
defendant’s characteristics. 
For instance, imagine that there are just two kinds of cases in a sample—
fraud and robbery—and that the average unexplained black-white gap is 5% for 
frauds and 20% for robberies. The Commission’s approach would produce an 
average disparity estimate somewhere between 5% and 20%, depending on 
what fraction of the cases are frauds and what fraction are robberies. If the 
fraction that are robberies is gradually growing over time, then racial disparity 
will appear larger in the regressions from the later periods even if nothing else 
changes (that is, even if the gap remains 5% for fraud cases and 20% for 
robbery cases).162 
Changes in the case mix are not the only potentially confounding 
developments that could occur over time. Other possibilities include the 
policies and prosecution strategies of the Department of Justice changing or 
taking time to trickle down to line prosecutors; changes in the composition of 
the judiciary, U.S. Attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices; or administrative 
changes in supervision of prosecutors that shift their incentives. Even if these 
developments had no racial purpose, they might have had racially disparate 
impacts. Causal inferences would be more credible if effects were visible in a 
much shorter time window, such that one could more confidently assume that 
Booker is the only important change that could have driven the outcome. One 
can also filter the surrounding trends out of the estimates of the policy’s effects 
by including them in the regression. 
 
162.  The Commission’s latest report does include some results broken down separately by case 
category, but these categories are broad, such as “drug trafficking.” See 2012 U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 7, pt. E, at 23-25. The case-type mix might change in 
subtler ways (for example, a growing number of methamphetamine cases, more car thefts, 
etc.), and the distributions of other important variables like criminal history might also 
change over time. 
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Among the recent Booker studies, Fischman and Schanzenbach’s offers an 
improvement on the standard approach.163 Their model filters out year-to-year 
variation in sentencing patterns for different categories of crimes and judicial 
districts, which captures an important subset of the things that might vary over 
time. They focus on changes in appellate review of sentencing and find that, in 
general, looser review has not been associated with increased racial disparity, 
although (like the Sentencing Commission) they do find a recent increase in 
disparity after Kimbrough and Gall.164 However, their approach only filters out 
trends in racial disparity if they are mediated by the crime category or district; 
any trends driven by other factors are left in. Below, we set forth an approach 
that filters out continuous trends in racial disparity itself (rather than trends in 
particular factors that contribute to it) and that uses monthly data to capture 
within-year variation as well. 
C.  Our Method 
In order to disentangle Booker’s effects from surrounding trends, rather 
than comparing racial disparities averaged over periods of years, we create 
flexible regression models that filter out month-to-month trends (including 
non-linear trends) in sentences and other relevant outcomes. We then look for 
sharp breaks in these trends—discontinuities—immediately after Booker. This 
approach is, in effect, a regression discontinuity-style estimator (RD), and, for 
simplicity, we will use the label RD here.165 Like other studies, we base our 
 
163.  Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 54. 
164.  Id. at 730. The authors further examine Kimbrough/Gall and their predecessor, Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), with an event study approach that effectively averages disparities 
over six-month periods, rather than the Commission’s longer periods. Fischman & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 54, at 757. Because they leave out the six months between Rita and 
Kimbrough/Gall, the last pre-period and first post-period are actually nearly a year apart. 
Although this analysis improves on the Sentencing Commission’s, we think an even finer-
grained approach to time trends yields greater payoffs for causal inference, and we also 
prefer to focus on Booker, the bigger legal change. 
165.  RD estimators are widely used in the education, public finance, political economy, and labor 
economics literatures to recover causal estimates when randomized experiments are not 
possible. See Guido W. Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs: A 
Guide to Practice, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 615 (2008); David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 
Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281 (2010). Although 
these estimators most frequently involve discontinuous thresholds in continuous running 
variables other than time (for instance, distance from a border), the method can be applied 
to the assessment of policy changes with time as the running variable. See, e.g., Michael L. 
Anderson, Subways, Strikes, and Slowdowns: The Impacts of Public Transit on Traffic Congestion 
10-11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18757, 2013), 
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causal inferences on changes over time, and any unmeasured changes that 
coincided with Booker could trick us. But because we are looking for immediate 
sharp changes, this concern is less grave. While a lot can change in a couple of 
years, usually a lot less changes suddenly in a couple of months. In addition, 
even if continuous background trends did have a noticeable effect on disparities 
in those couple of months, our method filters the trends out. We are looking 
only for sharp breaks that coincide with Booker. If the surrounding trends are 
fairly smooth and there is a sudden break at Booker, the inference that Booker 
caused the change depends only on the assumption that no other unobserved 
factor affecting sentencing disparity suddenly changed at the time of Booker. 
Our sample runs from fiscal years 2001 to 2009 and includes women and 
non-citizens (with controls for gender and citizenship). This broad sample 
definition is useful in improving the precision of the estimates by increasing 
the sample size within each month. However, the results are substantively 
similar if these groups are excluded. The sample includes all non-immigration 
cases except identity theft, which was subject to other major sentencing-law 
changes very near Booker.166 
Our overall research interest is in measuring the effect of changes to judicial 
sentencing discretion on sentencing and case processing disparities. We begin 
by looking at Guidelines departure rates, not because that is the ultimate 
outcome of interest, but because departure rates help us determine which legal 
reforms amounted to important changes to judges’ discretion in practice. They 
directly measure Guidelines compliance and thus are the most logical measure 
of the extent to which the Guidelines actually constrained judicial behavior at 
any given time. We focus our attention on Booker itself, not on its progeny 
Kimbrough and Gall or on the PROTECT Act’s tightening of the Guidelines. 
The reason can be seen plainly in Figure 1, which plots departure rates by 
sentencing month.167 Note that 96% of these departures are downward. 
 
 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18757.pdf; Wojciech Kopczuk et al., Do the Laws of Tax 
Incidence Hold? Point of Collection and the Pass-Through of State Diesel Taxes 23-24 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19410, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w19410.pdf. 
166.  Unlike in the linear trend analysis in Section A, we do not exclude Hispanic defendants from 
this analysis; they are included among the white and black defendants. However, our results 
are very similar if we do exclude Hispanic defendants, focusing on the gap between non-
Hispanic white and black defendants. 
167.  For reasons explained below, this graph and all others are limited to district courts in the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. The nationwide departure pattern looks 
similar. 
  







The vertical lines in Figure 1 mark four key events: the PROTECT Act, 
Blakely (Booker’s immediate predecessor), Booker, and Kimbrough/Gall (which 
clarified and strengthened Booker’s holding).168 As this graph makes clear, 
Booker was a major shock to the sentencing discretion afforded to judges. 
Departures increased immediately and substantially, from about 30% to about 
40%. Although there are other month-to-month fluctuations, Booker marks by 
far the most dramatic break. After the immediate Booker jump, departures 
continue on a gradually downward trajectory similar to the one that existed 
before Booker—but the whole graph is shifted upward by about 10%, and the 
departure rate never returns to its pre-Booker low. In other words, Booker’s 
effects were sudden, but they were also lasting. 
The sharpness of the change at Booker helps to alleviate one substantial 
concern about RD—its inability to capture effects that occur slowly. It is very 
possible that the full effects of Booker took a while to take hold—for example, 
the size of departures could have grown over time as judges became more 
comfortable with their newfound discretion. The inability to test that 
possibility is a disadvantage to our method. Policymakers are of course likely to 
be interested in Booker’s long-term effects. But focusing on the short-term 
 
168.  The graph includes all departures. In 46% of departure cases, the departure was requested 
by the government as a reward for “substantial assistance” in another case. If these were 
excluded, the pattern would look similar, but the rise immediately following Booker would 
be even steeper. 
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effects can tell us something important about the expected direction of Booker’s 
long-term consequences, even though we cannot directly measure those long-
term consequences. 
Why, after all, would one ever have worried that Booker might increase 
sentencing disparity, as critics, including the Sentencing Commission, did? 
The theory is that giving judges more discretion frees them to sentence in ways 
that turn on their conscious or unconscious sympathies with, or predictions 
about, particular defendants, and that those sympathies or predictions will 
differ on the basis of race or other factors correlated with race. That is, the 
theory assumes that judges have inclinations that effectively favor white 
defendants over similar black defendants (more strongly than the previous 
mandatory-Guidelines regime already favored white defendants). Booker 
provides a chance to test whether that theory appears to be true. Legally, 
making the Guidelines non-mandatory was a sudden and enormous change to 
judicial discretion. The departure graph shows that this change was not just 
theoretical and did not take long to have effects in practice. On the contrary, 
the doctrinal shock to the scope of judicial discretion immediately manifested 
itself in substantially more frequent judicial exercises of discretion. If judges 
were, in fact, inclined to use broader sentencing discretion in ways that 
disadvantage black defendants, one would expect to see at least some of that 
effect in the immediate vicinity of Booker, even if the full effects of the decision 
took a while to play out. If there is no jump in disparity at Booker, it suggests 
that judicial inclinations were not what critics feared they were. 
In contrast, the PROTECT Act and Kimbrough/Gall did not produce nearly 
as dramatic a change to the sentencing regime in practice. PROTECT appears 
to have caused no sudden change at all in departures. Kimbrough and Gall may 
have been more important—departure rates did rise afterwards—but the rise 
continued a trend that began three months before the decisions, and there was 
no sudden break in the trend (nor was there a sudden break at the time of Rita 
v. United States,169 five months earlier).170 Even if Rita and Kimbrough/Gall  
 
 
169.  551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
170.  This is not very surprising. PROTECT and Kimbrough/Gall were much subtler changes in 
the law. PROTECT and Gall did not directly speak to judges’ legal authority to depart; they 
affected appellate review standards and data collection procedures. See Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 40-41 (2007). Kimbrough did directly affect departure authority, but only in 
crack cases (in which mandatory minimums applied regardless); it was uncontested that 
judges could depart on policy grounds in other cases. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 
U.S. 85, 101-02 (2007). The crack holding could only have helped black defendants—a 
logical challenge for studies that point to Kimbrough as a source of racial disparity. 
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collectively led to an increase in departures, the fact that the decisions were 
separated by five months makes this too diffuse a change to judges’ sentencing 
discretion to assess with our method. And even combined, the change over that 
whole period is still much smaller than the change at Booker. One should not 
expect small changes to have big effects, and if they appear to, one has to 
suspect some confounding factor. Booker, as the bigger change, is the more 
logical place to test the effects of changing judicial discretion. 
We thus assess the effects of Booker’s shock to judges’ departure discretion 
on other stages and outcomes in the justice process. Because criminal cases 
have several key dates, the RD method can be used to isolate Booker’s effect on 
each key stage in the process. However, it cannot be used to directly estimate 
the aggregate effect of Booker on all stages. The Sentencing Commission and 
other Booker researchers have always divided cases by sentencing date, but 
many cases’ processing dates straddle Booker, so one cannot simply deem cases 
“pre-Booker” or “post-Booker.” We assess Booker’s effects on charging, as well 
as the sentencing consequences of those charging changes, by assessing what 
happens when the charging date passes Booker. Cases charged shortly before 
Booker will overwhelmingly have been disposed of and sentenced after 
Booker,171 so focusing on the immediate effects as the charging date passes 
Booker means that the sentencing effects of changing charging practices can be 
separated from the sentencing effects of changes to other process stages. 
Likewise, we assess plea-bargaining changes and their sentencing effects by 
assessing what happens when the conviction date passes Booker, and we assess 
changes in judicial behavior by assessing what happens when the sentencing 
date passes Booker. Note that the judicial behavior being measured involves not 
only changes to the final sentencing decision but also changes to sentencing 
fact-finding. Assessing the conviction date and the sentencing date separately 
helps to disentangle judges’ contributions to disparities in sentencing fact-
finding from disparities in the negotiated plea stipulations. 
The most serious complication in drawing causal inferences about Booker is 
that the decision was hardly a bolt from the blue. Rather, Booker followed six 
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely (denoted by the second 
vertical line in Figure 1), which applied the same Sixth Amendment analysis to 
a state sentencing scheme. It was Blakely that was an unexpected earthquake, 
rendering it fairly obvious that the federal Guidelines were in constitutional 
 
171.  The average time from charge to disposition in our sample is five months, and the average 
time from disposition to sentencing is a further four months. 
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trouble.172 What was not clear was what the Supreme Court would do to 
remedy the constitutional defect. Instead of the advisory guidelines approach 
(which none of the circuits had adopted), the Court could have struck the 
Guidelines down entirely, left them mandatory but shifted fact-finding to the 
jury, or left the whole matter to Congress. The lower courts began weighing in, 
and the Supreme Court quickly agreed to review Booker.173 
The Blakely decision raises a dilemma for causal inference for three reasons. 
First, it could mean that the effects we are looking for happened in a more 
diffuse manner starting before Booker, because courts or parties adjusted their 
behavior in anticipation of the mandatory Guidelines’ fall. In that case, 
estimating discontinuities at Booker alone might understate the effects of 
moving away from mandatory Guidelines. Second, the anticipation of Booker 
may have affected the mix of cases decided immediately before and after 
Booker, if district courts delayed sentencings while waiting for the Supreme 
Court’s opinion. Such changes in cases could confound estimates of Booker’s 
effects. Third, even assuming Booker did cause the measured changes, not all of 
Booker’s effects can necessarily be attributed to the expansion of judicial 
discretion. In addition to rendering the Guidelines advisory, Booker may have 
affected outcomes by ending the chaotic interregnum period and rejecting the 
alternative remedies that the Court could have chosen. These problems are not 
unique to our method—they afflict all studies of Booker—but they cannot be 
ignored. 
For this reason, we constrain our analysis to five federal judicial circuits: 
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh. Within two to six weeks of 
Blakely, these five courts of appeals issued decisions holding that Blakely did 
not apply to the federal Guidelines.174 In those circuits, Booker’s legal effects 
were simpler: it changed the governing law from the old regime (mandatory  
 
 
172.  The archives of Douglas Berman’s Sentencing Law and Policy blog for the period between 
the decisions in Blakely (June 24, 2004) and Booker (Jan. 12, 2005) provide an excellent 
record of this disarray. See, e.g., June 26, 2004, SENT’G L. & POL’Y, http://sentencing.typepad 
.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/week26/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012). 
173.  See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); see 
infra note 174 (listing lower court decisions). 
174.  United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1114 (2005); 
United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 995 (2005); 
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); 
United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Ferrell v. United 
States, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 543 U.S. 1101 (2005). 
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Guidelines) to the new one (advisory Guidelines). During the Blakely-to-Booker 
period, there was neither legal chaos nor a third legal regime. Figure 1, which is 
limited to these “business as usual” circuits, shows that nothing happened to 
departure rates at Blakely or during the interregnum—there was no trend break 
until Booker. 
Our focus on these circuits is only a partial solution to the Blakely problem. 
While district courts were required to follow the “business as usual” approach, 
if the parties anticipated that the Supreme Court would change the law before 
sentencing, they were free to let that expectation affect their charging and plea-
bargaining decisions.175 Therefore, as detailed below, we also analyze changes 
happening at the time of Blakely to see whether there is evidence of such 
anticipation effects. 
D.  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Booker’s Effects 
Here we present our RD estimates for key charge severity, plea-bargaining, 
and sentencing measures. In addition to the results presented below, we also 
assessed changes in the criminal justice “funnel,” which could have introduced 
sample selection bias into the RD estimates. However, we found no significant 
change in the rate of filing charges in district court as the charging date passed 
Booker, nor in the rate of non-petty convictions as the disposition date passed 
Booker.176 
1.  Changes to Charging 
The principal charging dynamic that we sought to analyze is whether 
Booker affected prosecutors’ use of mandatory minimums, which our (post-
Booker) findings discussed in Part II show to be a key driver of the black-white 
gap. There is also a logical causal mechanism for such an effect. Booker reduced  
 
 
175.  For instance, DOJ directed prosecutors to begin including aggravating factors in 
indictments, rather than waiting for the plea stipulation or sentencing hearing to allege 
them. See Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors, 
Departmental [sic] of Justice Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washington 
(July 2, 2004), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 357 (2004). This memo only suggested 
changes in the alleged facts, however, and not in the actual charges. 
176.  We treat January 2005 as the first month in the post-Booker period. There were six business 
days in January before Booker was decided, and the dataset gives dates only in months. 
Conflating the last week of the pre-period into the post-period is (if anything) likely to 
mean we slightly understate Booker’s effects. 
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prosecutors’ ability to use the Guidelines to control sentencing outcomes, an 
ability that confers massive leverage in plea-bargaining. Without being able to 
rely on the Guidelines, it is plausible that prosecutors might turn more often to 
their other tool for constraining judges: mandatory minimums. 
Our findings above also clearly showed that it was the initial charging stage 
in which the mandatory minimum disparity emerged, so that is a key stage to 
analyze. As explained above, we could not code initial charges in drug or child 
pornography cases. We only know the final mandatory minimum in these 
cases. Fortunately, unlike in the analysis in Part II, in this part of our analysis 
there is a solution to this problem. RD allows us to assess changes to the final 
mandatory minimum when the charging date passes Booker.177 Even though the 
outcome variable is measured at the conviction stage, changes in it that are 
triggered by the timing of the charge are probably the result of charging 
changes.178 This approach allows us to assess all case types. 
The results from the formal RD analysis are presented in Table 2, which 
shows the estimated discontinuous change in mandatory minimum convictions 
at Booker. Within each panel of the table, the first row (“Overall 
Discontinuity”) estimates the change for the whole population at Booker, while 
the second (“Black-White Difference Discontinuity”) estimates the Booker-
related change for black defendants relative to white defendants. That is, the 
second row measures the change in racial disparity at Booker. To see the 
estimated change for black defendants at Booker, one adds the estimates in the 
two rows. The estimated change for white defendants at Booker is simply the 
overall discontinuity. 
 
177.  The “charging date” is the date of the indictment, when there is one. In cases with no formal 
indictment, we used either the arrest date or the date the prosecutor opened the file on the 
case, whichever was later (usually they are the same month)—that is, the date that the 
prosecutor had both the case and the defendant in hand, and declined to add to or change 
the charges from the complaint. 
178.  If prosecutors suddenly started charging mandatory minimum offenses more often after 
Booker, that would presumably translate into more convictions of mandatory minimum 
offenses for cases charged after Booker, too. As noted above, initial charges usually are not 
dropped; from 2003 through the end of our study period, doing so required a supervisor’s 
special permission. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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We estimate regressions that include separate non-linear time trends for 
black and white defendants, before and after Booker—that is, we filter out both 
the overall underlying trends and the underlying trends in the black-white 
disparity. The regressions also filter out the month-to-month variation in 
arrest offenses and other pre-charge features of the case.179 The estimated 
discontinuities represent the break in the curve at Booker—that is, the 
difference between the intercepts of the pre-Booker curve and the post-Booker 
curve. 
Within each panel of Table 2, the four columns show the results of multiple 
specifications that use different methods of fitting curves to the data—we vary 
the length of the time window used to estimate the curves on each side (twelve 
months versus eighteen months) as well as the degree of the polynomial 
function of time (quadratic versus cubic). There is no one “right” choice for the 
window or the polynomial. A result is more robust if it is consistent across 
specifications, which suggests that it is not just an artifact of a subjective 
modeling choice. 
We find that as the charging date passes Booker, there is a significant, 
discontinuous increase in the mandatory minimum rate—but only for black 
defendants (Panel 1A). The estimated increase in the black-white disparity in 
mandatory minimums is quite large in all specifications, ranging from six to 
eleven percentage points, and is significant in three out of four specifications 
(and marginally significant in the fourth).180 Most of the increase in disparity is 
due to an increase for black defendants, but there also appears to be a smaller 
reduction in the frequency with which white defendants received mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
 
179.  The controls include arrest offense, criminal history, gender, age, a multi-defendant case 
flag, U.S. citizenship, criminal history, and education. The results shown exclude district, 
which was not an important contributor to racial disparity in our initial study; including so 
many dummy variables was problematic given the sample size per month. District was 
added in robustness checks, and the results were generally similar but often less precise. 
Note that controls serve a different function in RD than they do in other regressions—they 
are mainly there to absorb statistical noise. If there are underlying continuous trends in the 
effects of the control variables, those will be filtered out by the time-trend variables. 
Including the controls, however, protects against the possibility of sudden changes in 
underlying case features at Booker. In a perfect RD situation—that is, if one could safely 
assume that other variables changed only in continuous ways—one would not need controls 
at all, but we do not rely on that assumption. 
180.  To provide perspective, about 40% of defendants during 2004 faced a mandatory minimum. 
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Figure 2a provides an approximate visual representation of this result.181 
Although the RD is estimated based on a narrower window of time 
surrounding Booker, the graphs show longer surrounding trends to provide 
context. The hollow circles and dots represent the monthly averages in the 
residuals for white and black defendants, respectively, from a regression on all 
the variables from the RD. A residual is the difference between the actual 
outcome observed for an individual and the outcome predicted by a 
multivariate regression based on other observed characteristics (for example, 
arrest offense). Figure 2a thus shows the trends in average black and white 
charges after controlling for the cases’ underlying characteristics other than 
race. Curves are then fitted to these monthly averages to approximate the 
month-to-month trends for black and white defendants, and the vertical 
distance between the black and white curves represents the unexplained racial 








181.  The curves in the visual representations are fit slightly differently from the formal RD, so 
the correspondence between the figures and tables is only approximate. The figures contain 
the monthly average of the variable of interest along with curves fitted using kernel 
weighted local polynomial smoothing. The curves are fit separately on each side of Booker, 
and capture linear and non-linear trends over time. The vertical distance between the curves 
on either side at Booker (the difference in intercepts) is a visual approximation of the 
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The figure shows that the estimated jump in disparity after Booker is 
heavily influenced by the charging patterns in the first three months after 
Booker, especially the first month. Although there is an unexplained race gap in 
mandatory minimums through most of the period (the black line is above the 
white line), the trends had converged in the period leading up to Booker. In the 
month of Booker, there was a huge spike in black mandatory minimums. After 
the first few months, however, things seem to have reverted more or less to the 
previous trends. The race gap fluctuated somewhat, but the dominant 
background trend was a steady rise in mandatory minimums for both black 
and white defendants, and that trend continued. 
Overall, although there is a significant break, the patterns are much less 
dramatic than what we saw with the overall frequency of departures (Figure 1), 
in which the changes were much larger and stuck. When a trend break is 
driven largely by a one-month anomaly, one has to wonder if it is due to 
chance. Here, the divergence from the trend in that one month far exceeds the 
noise found in the rest of the data, so we suspect that it is connected to Booker, 
but, nonetheless, it did not seem to last. Perhaps prosecutors responded to the 
immediate shock of Booker with some degree of panic and hedged their bets 
against a possible coming wave of Guidelines departures by charging 
mandatory minimums (in a pattern disparately affecting black defendants). If 
so, charging may have reverted to normal when prosecutors saw that Booker 
did not cause a major drop in sentences (as we shall see below). This, of 
course, is only speculation. What we do know is that, despite the significant 
discontinuity, Booker’s longer-term effects on charging look fairly subtle. 
We next assess whether the ultimate sentence length was discontinuously 
affected by the charging date passing Booker—that is, did post-Booker changes 
in charging translate into sentencing consequences? We find only weak 
evidence on this point. All four specifications estimate that racial disparity in 
the sentence rose for cases charged immediately after Booker, with point 
estimates varying from four to ten months. However, the estimates are 
imprecise; three of the four are marginally significant (at the 0.10 level), and 
the fourth is insignificant. Visually, one can see the reason for the imprecision 
in Figure 2b: there is considerable noise in the sentence-length data, compared 
to which the break does not appear particularly clear.182 
 
182.  Likewise, Panel 1B shows some suggestive, but weak, evidence that the black-white gap in 
offense levels may have increased in cases charged immediately after Booker: the point 
estimates for the growth in disparity range from 0.3 to 1.1 levels, but these are only even 
marginally significant in two specifications. If there were an increase in offense-level 
disparity, it might well be the product of the increase in mandatory minimum charging 
 
 






2.  Changes in Plea-Bargaining 
We now turn to Booker’s effects on plea-bargaining, which we assess by 
examining what happens when the disposition date passes Booker. Specifically, 
we assess three outcomes: the conviction mandatory minimum, the final 
Guidelines offense level, and sentence length. The mandatory minimum and 
the offense level represent two key subjects of plea negotiations: the charge of 
conviction and the stipulations of sentencing facts. By assessing the effects of 
the conviction date on the offense level, we can separate out Booker’s effects on 
fact-bargaining from its effects on judicial fact-finding (which will be assessed 
below). We then turn to the ultimate sentencing consequences of any plea-
bargaining changes. 
These results can be quickly summarized: nothing dramatic happened, or 
at least, nothing that can be picked out from the noise of the surrounding data 
(Table 2, Column 2; Figures 3a-3c). Mandatory minimum rates for white 
defendants are in general noticeably higher after Booker than before it (Figure 
3a), but that increase actually occurred several months before Booker. 
Prosecutors, unlike judges, were free to adapt their behavior before the Court 
ruled, so these changes could have been in anticipation of Booker; if so, that 
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would mean that Booker could have increased white mandatory minimums, but 
too slowly for the RD analysis to detect. Booker does not appear to have had 
any significant discontinuous effects on racial disparity in plea-bargaining or 
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3.  Changes in Sentencing Fact-Finding and Sentencing Outcomes 
Finally, we assess changes in judicial decision-making by examining what 
happens when the sentencing date passes Booker. We focus our analysis on three 
outcomes: departures, the final Guidelines offense level, and sentence length. 
Booker directly expanded judges’ legal authority to depart, and we showed in 
Figure 1 that this expansion had an immediate effect. In Figure 4a and Panel 
3D, we break this effect down by race. We focus here on judicially initiated 
departures by excluding government-initiated departures for cooperating 
witnesses in order to examine the use of judicial discretion. The patterns are 
similar if one assesses all departures instead.183 The estimates all show a jump 
in white departure rates of five to seven percentage points and a slightly larger 
jump in black departure rates (eight to ten percentage points). If anything, 
then, black defendants may have benefited more from the increase in 
departures, but the change in black-white disparity is insignificant in most of 
the specifications.184 Notice that in Figure 4a, both the black and the white 
trends of declining departure rates after Booker are identical to the trends before 
it—but both curves are shifted upward. In other words, Booker’s boost to 
departures occurred immediately, affected black and white defendants quite 
similarly, and clearly had a lasting effect. 
 
183.  If one looks at all departures, there is still no significant rise in disparity. 
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Booker’s legal holding did not directly affect fact-finding, but it could have 
affected it indirectly (even setting aside any effects on plea negotiations, which 
our focus on the sentencing date filters out). If a judge believes the sentencing 
range that follows from the plea agreement is inappropriate, she has two 
options for altering it: she can make findings of fact that “go behind the plea” 
or she can depart from the Guidelines.185 Expanded authority to do the latter 
might make it less necessary to do the former.186 
Therefore, in Panel 3B and Figure 4b, we assess whether fact-finding 
disparities differed in cases sentenced immediately after Booker. The results are 
inconclusive because the estimates are imprecise, but again, if anything, it looks 
as though changes in judicial decision-making after Booker cut in the direction 
of reducing the black-white gap. The sign of the change in disparity is negative 
in all four specifications (with point estimates ranging from -0.5 to -1.1 offense 
levels).187 The final offense level increases for white defendants in three out of 
 
185.  See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 28-29 (2006). 
186.  As discussed above, survey data show that most judges do not diverge from the plea 
stipulations very often—but that does not mean they never do. The reason they choose to do 
so in particular cases might be the same reason they might consider departing: 
dissatisfaction with the sentence that the facts in the plea agreement would produce 
according to the Guidelines. 
187.  Although we did not include an additional graph, in Panel 3A, we also show changes in the 
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four specifications, but decreases for black defendants in three out of four 
specifications. Note that, while Figure 4b shows a fairly clear long-term trend 
of higher offense levels for white defendants, that increase cannot be safely 
causally attributed to Booker because RD estimates only the local effect right at 
the discontinuity. We return to the question of assessing long-term trends in 






Finally, we look at the effect on sentence length as the sentencing date 
passes Booker—the inquiry that provides the most direct counterpoint to the 
Sentencing Commission’s claims about Booker’s effects. As Figure 4c and Panel 
3C of Table 2 show, there appears to have been an immediate drop in the 
length of black defendants’ sentences at Booker. White sentences did not fall, 
however, even though white departures increased. Perhaps the increase in 
 
understood to reflect potential changes in fact-finding. The mandatory minimum can be 
affected by events at the sentencing stage in some contexts, because judicial fact-finding 
sometimes determines whether mandatory minimums apply. The most important example 
of this is drug quantity, which is not always stipulated in a guilty plea to a drug trafficking 
charge. We do not find any significant racially disparate changes in this variable occurring in 
cases sentenced after Booker. If anything, disparity may have declined, but just as with the 
offense level variable, the change is insignificant in all four specifications. However, there is 
a statistically significant overall increase in the mandatory minimum rate. One theory is that 
Booker led prosecutors to push more aggressively at the sentencing hearing for quantity 
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departures was offset by the fact-finding changes discussed above.188 Thus, 
there is an estimated reduction in black-white sentence disparity in cases 
sentenced just after Booker (by between four and fifteen months, depending on 
the specification). This directly contravenes the conclusion implied by the 
Sentencing Commission’s report. However, the contrary conclusion is only 
tentative. There is again considerable noise in the sentencing data, and the 
estimate is only significant in two of the specifications. Still, one can say that 







Taking Figures 4a through 4c together, one can see that the sustained trend 
of increasing offense levels seen in Figure 4b may help to explain what 
otherwise might have been a mystery: why (as Figure 4c shows) sentences did 
not go down in the long run after Booker, even though downward departures 
went way up and stayed up (Figure 4a). The effect of the departure increase 
may have been canceled out by the rise in offense levels (for both black and 
white defendants). The magnitude of the rise in offense levels looks fairly 
small—perhaps half of one offense level—and one might wonder how such a 
subtle shift could cancel out such a large increase in departures. The answer is 
 
188.  Indeed, if anything, there is a visible upward turn in the white trend at Booker (although it 
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that although the increase in departures at Booker was a very sharp break in the 
prior trend, it still only affected a small percentage of cases (about 8%, 
according to the RD). The average size of a departure from 2005 to 2009 was 
twenty-nine months, so a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 
Booker brought the average sentence down by only about 2.3 months. An 
increase of just one-half an offense level, applied to the average case in the 
sample, would raise the low end of the Guidelines range by two months, 
enough to cancel out most of that departure effect. 
Thus, although Booker was the biggest sudden change to federal judges’ 
sentencing discretion since the Guidelines’ adoption, it nonetheless was 
perhaps less of a revolution than various observers either feared or hoped. 
Booker is only what federal judges make of it, and, so far, that appears not to 
have been much. This post-Booker stability should not be taken as especially 
good news for those concerned about incarceration rates for black men. If 
Booker does not change judicial behavior very much, then it cannot do what 
critics of the Guidelines hoped: substantially mitigate the Guidelines’ 
harshness. In the long run, sentences have continued to increase, even after 
controlling for shifts in the pool of offenses and offenders. And with plea levels 
still over 96%, prosecutors’ tremendous leverage appears to remain intact. 
E.  Limitations and Causal Inference Challenges 
Unlike the Sentencing Commission, we find no evidence that Booker 
increased racial disparity in the exercise of judicial discretion; if anything it 
may have reduced it. The only possibly adverse effects for black defendants 
that we see arise from prosecutors’ shift to mandatory minimums, although 
that shift appears to have been temporary. Like the results of the charging 
study discussed in Part II, these findings cut against the case for restoring 
constraints on judicial discretion. Still, there are some limitations to our 
method. As we have already discussed, it provides only local estimates of 
immediate effects, rather than long-term effects. Beyond that, there are a few 
other things to keep in mind. 
1.  Limitations of the RD Method 
First, it is important to understand what our RD analysis does not assess. In 
the charging study described in Part II, we sought to disentangle the share of 
the black-white gap that was explained by the disparate impact of factors such 
as criminal history from unexplained disparities that could represent racially 
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disparate treatment.189 Here, in our Booker analysis, we only do that in a 
limited sense. We do control for the arrest offense and the other pre-charge 
covariates, so in that sense we are measuring changes in (apparently) 
“unwarranted” disparity. Controlling for those variables means that if the 
relative composition of the black and white defendant pools (in terms of the 
observable variables) changed suddenly right around Booker—either due to 
random or seasonal variation in crime or to reaction to Booker itself—it should 
not bias the results. 
But the coefficients on those variables—the strength of the relationships 
between each of them and the outcome variable—are estimated only for the 
entire time period. While the trends will filter out any smooth (gradual) 
changes over time, they cannot filter out sharp sudden changes that coincide 
with Booker. We do not separately estimate, for instance, the relationship 
between criminal history and sentence length before and after Booker. If 
criminal history becomes a stronger predictor of sentence length gradually 
during the time period, the polynomial trends in our regression would filter 
that change out. But if the relationship between criminal history and sentence 
length changes suddenly at Booker—if Booker changes it—our method will not 
filter out that change. 
In effect, what that means is that we are focused on the question, “Did 
Booker change racial disparity patterns in charging, plea-bargaining, and 
sentencing?” rather than “Why did Booker change those patterns?” If, for 
instance, prosecutors started using mandatory minimums more against black 
defendants, this need not have been motivated by race—it could have been 
motivated by wanting to crack down on gun crimes, for instance. In short, we 
are estimating Booker’s racially disparate impacts. We do not filter out the share 
of those impacts that are mediated by other variables—not just because doing 
so is impractical with our method but also because it is undesirable. If 
policymakers care about the effects of sentencing reform on black incarceration 
rates, filtering out everything that is not racially motivated would not convey 
those consequences fully. Together, the results of the study described in Part II 
and our Booker results in this Part present a fairly rich picture of the static 
factors (case features) and dynamic factors (sentencing law reform) that 
contribute to outcomes at each procedural stage. 
Second, while RD effectively filters out long-term trends, it is vulnerable to 
statistical noise that might generate false positives. If the graph is sufficiently 
noisy, one might be able to see discontinuities at lots of points. Of course, 
Booker need not have been the only shift over the course of the study period to 
 
189.  See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
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be a real shift. But if there are frequent breaks, even at points where there are 
no known triggering events, then not much can be made of finding a break at 
Booker as well. 
We think that with appropriately cautious interpretation, this is not such a 
serious problem—far less serious than the causal inference problem that 
pervades other studies. This is why we fit the monthly trends with multiple 
kinds of functions and do not put stock in an apparent discontinuity that 
appears only in one version. It is why we do not use even higher-order 
polynomials, which would likely over-fit the data. It is also why the graphs 
matter, perhaps more than the numbers. If a discontinuity cannot be picked 
out with the eye—or if it looks no different from many other unexplained 
breaks—then it is probably nothing to write home about. 
As an additional precaution, we conducted placebo tests on every outcome 
variable, re-running all of the analyses shown in Table 2, except applied to 
twelve other arbitrary breaking points across the study period.190 We deemed 
the results of these tests “false positives” when, at the breaking point in 
question, a significant discontinuity appeared in more than one out of the four 
model specifications. These tests were reasonably reassuring. In the mandatory 
minimum variable, when the placebo tests were run by charging date or by 
disposition date, there were false positives at just one out of twelve of these 
breaking points; when the tests were run by sentencing date, there were no 
false positives. This makes us more confident that the spike in cases in which 
mandatory minimum offenses were charged just after Booker—although brief—
was likely something real, because this variable is not particularly noisy. The 
sentence length variable was visibly noisier in the graphs and unsurprisingly 
had more false positives in the placebo tests: just one when the placebos were 
run by charging month, but four when run by disposition month or by 
sentence month. In the offense level variable, there were two false positives 
when the placebos were run by charging month or by disposition month, and 
one when they were run by sentence month. The departure variable had two 
 
190.  These breaking points were in six-month increments every January and July from 2002 
through 2008, not including the months immediately following Blakely (July 2004), which 
we analyze separately below, and Booker (January 2005). Thus, the tests are also a check 
against the possibility that what appears to be a discontinuity caused by Booker is actually 
just a regular seasonal variation; if that were true, one would expect similar discontinuities 
in other Januaries. 
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false positives (run by sentencing month), but visual inspection makes clear 
that Booker was by far the cleanest break in the study period.191 
2.  Blakely and Anticipation of Booker 
Finally, we return to the question of Blakely and anticipation of Booker. 
Blakely is marked with a dotted line in the figures, and we also repeated all the 
numeric analyses on it. There are no apparent breaks in departures, offense 
level, or sentence length when the sentencing date passes Blakely (Figures 4a-
4c). It appears that the courts included in these analyses really did follow the 
“business as usual rule.” 
But what about prosecutors? As to plea-bargaining, we find no evidence of 
discontinuous changes caused by Blakely in the “business as usual” circuits. 
When time trends are estimated based on the disposition month, severity on all 
measures (mandatory minimum rates, offense levels, and the ultimate 
sentence) looks relatively low during the first two months after Blakely, 
especially for white defendants (Figures 3a-3c). One might wonder whether 
this is because Blakely increased defendants’ plea-bargaining leverage.192 But a 
downward trend in these severity measures had already been underway for at 
least six months before Blakely, and the post-Blakely months do not represent a 
significant break from that trend. Moreover, the downward trend turns around 
again by the third month after Blakely. In short, while there are some trend 
fluctuations when the outcome variables are graphed by disposition date, they 
do not seem connected to Blakely (or Booker, as discussed above). 
The one thing that does look like it changed discontinuously after Blakely is 
disparity in mandatory minimums, which declined (Figure 2a). The reduction 
consists mostly of a rise in mandatory minimums for white defendants and is 
concentrated in drug cases. For cases charged during the whole six-month 
period between Blakely and Booker, the black-white gap in mandatory 
minimums looks quite small, until it jumped in the month of Booker. This is 
 
191.  Note that “false positives” are not necessarily the result of random noise; they could be the 
result of other influential events that happen to take place around the time of those breaking 
points. 
192.  Some observers believed that Blakely would be read to mean the prosecutor could not argue 
aggravating factors at sentencing unless they had been proven to the jury or pled to by the 
defendant. Two other circuits (outside our sample) had so held. See United States v. 
Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 
2004), aff’d, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Such a rule would be expected to strengthen defendants’ 
plea-bargaining leverage, because a prosecutor would likely often have to offer at least some 
compromise on aggravating factors in order to avoid a jury trial on them. 
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another potential reason not to make too much of the spike in charging 
disparity at Booker—in addition to being temporary, it could have been partly 
the result of the disparity being anomalously small during the Blakely-to-Booker 
period. Also, changes in charging disparity around Blakely might affect the 
interpretation of our analysis of changes in plea bargaining or sentencing after 
Booker (since the same cases could be charged near Blakely and then either plea-
bargained or sentenced near Booker). 
However, there are two reasons we believe the post-Blakely change in 
mandatory minimum disparity does not pose a serious problem for our 
interpretation of the Booker results. First, the mandatory minimum changes 
after Blakely (unlike those we observed after Booker) did not translate into 
discontinuous changes in sentence disparity in cases charged after Blakely 
(Figure 2b). Further analysis suggests that this is because the increase in the 
presence of mandatory minimums in white defendants’ cases was offset by an 
increase in waivers of those mandatory minimums under the “safety valve” 
exception that applies in some drug cases.193 The subset of cases in which 
mandatory minimum charging patterns changed after Blakely were drug cases 
that were safety-valve eligible, meaning that the mandatory minimum is less 
consequential than usual.194 
Second, the time between each key date in a case varies considerably. For 
instance, it is not as though all of the cases charged in the month after Blakely 
were sentenced in the month right after Booker. Rather, from one sentencing 
month to the next, there is a gradual increase and then a gradual decrease in 
the probability of the case having been charged right after Blakely. In other 
words, whatever effect changes in charging after Blakely had on sentencing 
should be part of the continuous polynomial trends that the RD filters out. To 
substantially affect the discontinuity estimates at Booker, the probability of 
 
193.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), district courts may waive the mandatory minimum in certain 
drug trafficking cases involving nonviolent offenders with very little criminal history and no 
leadership role in a conspiracy, so long as the defendant has given the government a truthful 
and complete account of the crime. 
194.  We preferred to use a principal mandatory minimum measure that was determined by the 
charges of conviction (and findings of fact related to the crime’s severity, such as drug 
quantity), rather than a measure also shaped by the other statutory factors that determine 
safety-valve eligibility. Our mandatory minimum variable is accordingly based on the 
sentencing judge’s finding that there is an applicable mandatory minimum in the case. In 
some cases coded as having mandatory minimums, the minimums were ultimately waived 
under the safety valves or due to cooperation. At Blakely, there is no discontinuous change in 
non-waived mandatory minimums for either black or white defendants. In contrast, at 
Booker, there was a discontinuous spike in mandatory minimums for black defendants 
regardless of whether one codes the safety-valve cases as involving mandatory minimums. 
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having been a post-Blakely case would have to have plunged suddenly in the 
month of Booker. This is a substantial advantage of RD over other methods.195 
A final concern about the interregnum period is that some cases could have 
been delayed until after Booker, such that the cases immediately after Booker 
would not have the same characteristics as those immediately before it. Such 
manipulation could pose a threat to identification using RD. Fortunately, it is 
not the case that any manipulation of timing is fatal to causal inference. As 
David Lee and Thomas Lemieux explain, “If individuals—even while having 
some influence—are unable to precisely manipulate the assignment variable, a 
consequence of this is that the variation in treatment near the threshold is 
randomized as though from a randomized experiment.”196 The non-
manipulation assumption is thus relatively modest—it only requires that cases 
sentenced very near Booker were not subject to the court’s precise manipulation 
of which side of the line they fell on. If a court merely took steps to make it 
more likely that a case would be sentenced after Booker, such as scheduling the 
sentencing hearing for a faraway date, this would not be seriously problematic. 
The scheduling would have gotten the case near Booker, but there would still 
have been a chance element determining which side it landed on. This chance 
element is amplified by the fact that nobody knew when the Supreme Court 
would rule: legal observers performed terribly at predicting Booker’s release, 
with many predicting a very fast decision after the October argument.197 In 
addition, sentencing hearings are scheduled months in advance so as to allow 
the Probation Office time to complete the pre-sentence investigation report and 
to allow the parties time to prepare (and to arrange for the presence of 
witnesses in some cases). This delay makes it especially difficult to precisely 
manipulate the timing of a case relative to a Supreme Court decision. 
 
195.  This is a principal reason we do not simply use a short-window differences-in-differences 
approach—for instance, comparing the three months before Booker to the three months 
after. If we had, the Blakely effects would have been very different in the pre- and post-
periods. 
196.  Lee & Lemieux, supra note 165, at 283. 
197.  E.g., Ian Weinstein & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Federal Sentencing During the Interregnum: 
Defense Practice as the Blakely Dust Settles, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 51, 51 (2004) (predicting a 
decision by Thanksgiving). In the months after Booker, the archives of the leading 
sentencing blog include a series of predictions, citing informed observers in the legal 
community, that Booker would be decided the next day. E.g., Douglas A. Berman, At Least 
One More Day to Wait Until Booker and Fanfan, SENT’G. L. & POL’Y (Dec. 7, 2004, 10:15 
AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/12/theyre_here 
_emb.html (“I have now heard from a large group of insightful folks predicting that 
tomorrow will (finally) bring the decision. . . . At this point, I will believe it when I see it.”). 
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Still, we analyzed the number and characteristics of cases on either side of 
Booker, looking for any evidence of manipulation. We found none. The number 
of cases sentenced in December 2004 was 1679; the number in January 2005 
was 1682. If sentencings were being delayed, one would expect the mean 
elapsed time since the plea to be greater for cases after Booker, but in fact, the 
mean elapsed times were nearly identical (indeed, very slightly shorter after 
Booker): 3.99 months before versus 3.96 months after. The breakdowns by race 
and crime category were likewise essentially identical before and after.198 If 
anything, there may have been some delaying of cases in November 2004 when 
1566 cases were sentenced, the lowest volume that year. Expectations of an 
early Booker decision were high during November 2004,199 but the dip was 
small, and it appears the counts went back to normal once the Court did not 
release its decision quickly. After Booker, the number of cases also stayed 
normal; it was slightly higher in March (when 1825 cases were sentenced), but 
this was lower than four other months in 2004 and 2005. In short, there is very 
good reason to believe that the courts in the circuits included in our analyses 
really did conduct “business as usual,” or at least that any manipulations were 
too imprecise to threaten RD’s assumption of effective randomness in the 
immediate vicinity of the discontinuity.200 
conclusion 
Determining the causes of racial disparities in criminal justice is not easy. 
We believe our approach improves substantially on existing research, but we 
do not offer definitive answers and doubt that anyone will soon. So what are 
policymakers to do? We do not seek to answer that question completely. Even 
if we had crystalline empirical answers, criminal justice policy does not turn on 
 
198.  Of course, it is theoretically possible that manipulation could have caused the case 
characteristics to vary only in unobservable ways, but this seems unlikely in practice. If there 
were substantial manipulation, it seems unlikely that it would not have had any effect on the 
distribution of observable case characteristics like case category and elapsed crime, nor on 
the case counts. 
199.  E.g., Douglas A. Berman, Not Yet for Booker and Fanfan, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Nov. 9, 2004, 
10:20 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/11/not_yet 
_for_emb.html. 
200.  In any event, manipulation would only bias our results if it occurred in a racially disparate 
way. And the manipulation concern applies only to our analysis of sentencing responses to 
Booker—there is no reason to believe that any prosecutor would wait to charge or plea-
bargain a case until after Booker, nor would defendants likely take the large risk of stalling 
guilty pleas and risking their withdrawal while waiting for a Supreme Court decision. 
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demographic disparity alone—many competing objectives must be considered. 
That said, our results have implications for these dilemmas, and we fear that 
the contrary results of existing research may be distorted to support 
counterproductive “solutions” to racial disparities. We close with some brief 
thoughts on these points. 
First, despite our concerns about the methods of the Sentencing 
Commission and others, we agree that the high rate of incarceration of black 
men is a serious social problem and that examining the possible contribution of 
disparities in the criminal justice system is important. Our research suggests 
that, in the federal system, disparities in the post-arrest justice process 
contribute to this problem. After controlling for the arrest offense, criminal 
history, and other prior characteristics, sentences for black male arrestees 
diverge substantially from those of white male arrestees (by around 10% on 
average). While this disparity does not seem to be growing, it is persistent. 
Second, the procedural source of this disparity matters, and it is thus a 
mistake to focus on judicial sentencing alone. Our research suggests that racial 
disparities in recent years have been largely driven by the cases in which judges 
have the least sentencing discretion: those with mandatory minimums. Our 
assessment of Booker is more tentative, but we find no evidence that it increased 
racial disparity. The Sentencing Commission’s contrary conclusion is based on 
deeply flawed methods. 
For these reasons, we are particularly concerned about proposals to respond 
to sentencing disparities by restoring tighter constraints on sentencing, 
especially those that entail expanding mandatory minimums.201 Our results 
suggest that this would not reduce disparities in the justice process. Quite the 
contrary: we find that prosecutors file mandatory minimums twice as often 
against black men as against comparable white men. Moreover, for those 
concerned about mass incarceration of black men, expanding mandatory 
minimums would be counterproductive. Even setting aside racial disparities 
internal to the criminal justice system, sentencing law changes that increase 
severity have a particularly adverse impact on black men, who are 
disproportionately involved in the system in the first place. Making sentencing 
law more rigid would likely exacerbate this problem even if it led to more 
equitable administration of the law—and our results suggest that it would 
likely lead to less equitable administration. 
Third, we do not advocate attempting to reduce disparity by taking 
discretion away from prosecutors. Eliminating prosecutorial discretion is 
probably impossible. The Department of Justice has certainly tried. The 
 
201.  See Gonzales, supra note 15. 
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disparities we found persisted despite the Ashcroft Memo ordering prosecutors 
to charge and pursue the “most serious, readily provable offense,” as well as 
DOJ bans on fact-bargaining.202 Taken at their word, these policies would have 
stripped almost all discretion from line prosecutors. But such policies are very 
difficult to enforce, because line prosecutors inevitably must subjectively 
evaluate the available evidence.203 And even if constraining prosecutorial 
discretion did succeed, one might see another “hydraulic” effect. If prosecutors 
had to pursue every case law enforcement brought them to the fullest, their 
current power over case outcomes might shift another step back—to law 
enforcement, where it might be even harder to monitor. Prosecutors’ decision-
making is notoriously difficult to observe—unlike judges, they do not publish 
written reasoning. But law enforcement is even more of a “black box.” 
Even if all discretion could somehow be removed from the justice system, 
we doubt this would create a justice system anybody would want. Flexibility 
allows appropriate tailoring of both charges and sentences to the circumstances 
of individual cases, so as to avoid unduly harsh punishments when they are not 
justified. Efforts to eliminate unwarranted disparities are important, but they 
should not come at the cost of unwarranted uniformity. Instead, rather than 
looking for ways to curtail prosecutorial discretion, legislators could consider 
curtailing prosecutorial power by dialing back existing mandatory minimums. 
If sentencing laws were less rigid, it would be less necessary for decision-
makers to find ad hoc means of mitigating their impact. The Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010, which reduced crack sentences, showed that it is politically 
possible to reform excessive sentencing laws, and that empirical evidence of 
racial disparities can help to bring such changes about.204 
One potential next focus could be the severe gun enhancements in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c). These laws hit black men particularly hard because, as our 
data show, they are more frequently arrested for gun crimes and because of 
large apparent disparities in prosecutors’ exercise of charging discretion. 
Certainly, policymakers must weigh this problem against concerns about gun 
violence. Notwithstanding these serious concerns, we wonder whether the 
mandatory minimums in the statute are truly always necessary, such that 
judicial discretion should be precluded. For instance, is a five-year add-on 
sentence really necessary in every case in which a firearm has merely been 
 
202.  Ashcroft, supra note 82. 
203.  See Miller, supra note 33, at 1257; Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1425-26 (1997); Stith, supra 
note 21, at 1470. 
204.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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carried—let alone a mandatory extra twenty-five years for a second gun and yet 
another twenty-five for a third?205 Prosecutors would likely feel less need to 
“swallow a gun” if the gun did not automatically trigger a massive additional 
penalty. 
Finally, while our approach is far more comprehensive than that of prior 
sentencing studies, there is enormous room for further exploration. For 
instance, we plan to explore further the possible role of sentencing fact-finding 
in producing racial disparities. More research is also necessary to see whether 
patterns like those we found are also present in state courts. More generally, we 
do not claim to have proven purposeful discrimination by prosecutors or 
anyone else—it would be impossible to do so with administrative data like 
ours. Other kinds of studies may be necessary to dig deeper into causal theories 
for racial disparities: perhaps experimental studies in which race is randomly 
assigned to otherwise identical prosecutor files, or qualitative studies involving 
reviews of case files and interviews.206 DOJ itself is well positioned to carry out 
such work. One easy step would be for DOJ to keep statistics on mandatory 
minimum charging decisions by race when it tracks prosecutors’ performance. 
Doing so would not only facilitate research but could also help prosecutors 
who do not want to contribute to disparities but might not be conscious of 
them. The government itself should take the elimination of disparities in 
criminal justice as seriously as other civil rights enforcement matters, and it 
should think creatively about solutions and strategies for answering the 
empirical questions that remain. 
 
205.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). 
206.  In contexts such as employment and housing, disparity researchers can experimentally 
manipulate race while leaving other factors identical. See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a 
Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003). The federal government uses “testers” (fake 
applicants) to enforce its discrimination statutes. See Fair Housing Testing Program, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_testing.php (last visited Sept. 
1, 2013). Similar field experiments in criminal justice would generally be illegal: a crime 
staged for research is still a crime, as is submitting fake information to authorities. But such 
studies could be legislatively authorized, under regulated conditions, and perhaps carried 
out by DOJ itself. 
